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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate how regulation and deregulation impacts
hospital performance, its persistence effect and the different impact on drug markets. The
authorities designed programs and policies to regulate hospitals and pharmaceutical markets,
aiming at improving hospital performance and control drug prices, while in reality, the programs
and policies generate consequences, the effect varies across different types of the hospitals and
drugs.
The dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay proposes a propensity score
matching-difference in difference framework of program evaluation of Value Based Purchasing
program. This framework first applies the propensity score matching method to find a treated
group whose characteristics are comparable to our control group (hospitals in Maryland). Next, I
used the difference in difference method to evaluate whether and how the VBP program impacts
hospitals performance in terms of quality, satisfaction, safety and efficiency. Our empirical
analysis using 5 years of hospital performance data from various sources. The results showed that,
under the program of VBP, hospitals that are impacted did show improvements in patient
experience, but in terms of experience dimensions, only pain control scores were improved
significantly. Regarding safety, cost efficiency and conformance quality, the impacted hospitals
did not show significant improvements. The sensitivity check supports our conclusion.
The second essay studies the state dependence effect of payment adjustments on hospitals
to see whether the effect exist and how it varies across hospitals of different characteristics, socioeconomic factors and geo-locations. The program adjusts the payment as follows: First, the
program reduces a portion of the hospital`s Medicare payments in a specific fiscal year and then
by the end of the same fiscal year, the amount of the payment reductions will be awarded to the
hospitals based on the total performance score, thus the hospitals that do not receive the reward
will lose the portion of money reduced by Medicare. In this essay, I apply the theory of state
dependence and use the dynamic random effect probit model to estimate this effect. The results
show that the hospital payment adjustment dynamics have a very significant state dependence
effect (0.341), that means, hospitals that received a reward in previous year are 34.1% more

probably to receive a reward this year than the ones that received a penalty in previous year.
Meanwhile, I also find that the state dependence effect varies significantly across hospitals with
different ownership (proprietary/government owned/voluntary nonprofit), the results show that
voluntary nonprofit hospitals exhibit largest effect of state dependence (0.370), while government
owned hospitals exhibit lowest effect of state dependence (0.293) and proprietary hospitals are in
the middle. Among the factors that influence the likelihood a hospital receive a reward, I find that
teaching hospitals with large number of beds (>400), are less likely be rewarded; in terms of
ownership, I find that voluntary nonprofit hospitals are more likely be rewarded; in terms of
demographic factors, hospitals where the average household income are higher within the region
are more likely be rewarded.
The third essay studies the effect of deregulation of price cap in pharmaceutical market.
Price regulation (either through price cap or reference price) is common practice in pharmaceutical
market but recently there are increasing voices calling for deregulation claiming that deregulation
could help with lowering drug price and increase revenue of pharmaceutical firms. Upon those
callings, Chinese government removed the price cap regulation in June 2015. In this essay, I
applied the interrupted time series analysis (ITSA) on the sales revenue data of nine categories of
both generic and branded drugs in China from March 2011 to August 2016 (the time frame includes
both before and after of the initialization of the deregulation) and analyzed the effect of
deregulation. The results showed that, whether the revenue of drugs will increase or decrease after
the deregulation of price cap depends on the level of competition and the change of patterns of the
branded and generic drugs are different. When HHI is sufficiently low (competition is high),
revenue does not change as a result of deregulation, when HHI is moderately low (moderate
competition), revenue from generic drugs will decrease significantly and revenue from branded
drugs will increase significantly, when HHI is high (low competition), revenue from generic drugs
will increase significantly and revenue from branded drugs will decrease significantly.
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CHAPTER ONE: OVERVIEW OF DISSERTATION
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation consists of three essays about authorities` regulation and deregulation
policies in face of performance shortfalls. Hospitals have long been criticized for ignoring patient
experience and satisfaction, the payment model of healthcare also have long been blamed for
focusing on quantity not on quality. In face of the critics and challenges, Center for Medicare &
Medicaid Services (CMS) designed and launched the Hospital Value Based Purchasing (HVBP)
program, which is the first nationwide pay-for-performance (P4P) program aiming at
transforming the traditional payment model with a focus on quantity to a new payment model
with a focus on quality, improving hospital performance four folds: conformance quality, cost
efficiency, safety and patient experience. In 2003, CMS tested the Premier Hospital Quality
Incentive Demonstration, a pay-for-performance pilot project involving more than 200 hospitals,
which provided financial incentives to physician groups that performed well on quality and cost
measures (Damberg et al. 2014). In 2005, it launched Hospital Compare database with public
reporting of process measures of hospital quality, later extending this reporting to include clinical
outcomes such as mortality rates too.
However, balancing different resource management strategies to improve performance is
not an easy task for the hospitals. Inclusion of patient experience of care or patient satisfaction
has led to a vigorous debate in the industry. Advocates for inclusion of patient satisfaction
contend that it measures critical components of care that only patients can report, such as
whether pain was addressed effectively or if patients received clear communication from
physicians and nurses. This makes it an essential measure of how well a health care system
function. In an industry where the patient should be the primary focus, the content of their
experiences can help clinicians to better mobilize around their needs. This builds trust in the
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healthcare system from the perspective of the patient and promotes collaborative practices
between clinicians and patients (Chatterjee et al. 2015). Prior studies in multiple healthcare
settings have shown that poor patient satisfaction with the health care system is associated with
slower recovery from illness and a lower likelihood of compliance with prescribed treatment
regimens. Consequently, suboptimal patient experience has important implications not only for
the health of patients but also for health care costs, which increase when patients use more health
care services because of poor recovery and non-compliance (Chatterjee et al. 2012). When
patients have a better experience, they are more likely to comply with treatments, return for
follow-up appointments, and engage with the healthcare system by seeking appropriate care
(Chatterjee et al. 2015).
Critics of including patient satisfaction in HVBP program argue that doing so is driving
physicians to focus on the wrong priorities whereby hospitals end up behaving as hotels. Using
patient satisfaction as a metric shifts provider attention away from delivering technically
effective care to fulfilling patient expectations and demands (Chatterjee et al. 2015). By
conflicting with the clinical practice guidelines higher patient satisfaction, in fact, may be
associated with a higher rate of inpatient admissions, higher overall healthcare costs, and
increased mortality. For example, providing a prescription may result in a satisfied patient but
increase the cost of care and may contribute to ills such as antibiotic resistance and opioid crisis
(Lindsay 2017).
Due to these concerns, Medicare stopped using pain management questions as inputs in
its payment formula. I collected multi-year data from six diverse data sources, employed
propensity score matching to obtain comparable groups, and estimated difference-in-difference
models to show that, in fact, pain management was the only measure to improve in response to
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pay-for-performance system. No other input measure showed significant improvement. Thus,
removing pain management from the formula risks rendering the entire program ineffective. I
suggest two divergent paths for Medicare to make the program more effective.
Furthermore, I would like to analyze is there a state dependence effect in the payment
adjustment for the HVBP program. In the second essay, I apply the theory of state dependence
and use the dynamic random effect probit model to estimate this effect. The results show that the
hospital payment adjustment dynamics have a very significant state dependence effect (0.341),
that means, hospitals that received a reward in previous year are 34.1% more probably to receive
a reward this year than the ones that received a penalty in previous year. Meanwhile, I also find
that the state dependence effect varies significantly across hospitals with different ownership
(proprietary/government owned/voluntary non profit), the results show that voluntary non profit
hospitals exhibit largest effect of state dependence (0.370), while government owned hospitals
exhibit lowest effect of state dependence (0.293) and proprietary hospitals are in the middle.
Among the factors that influence the likelihood a hospital receive a reward, we find that teaching
hospitals with large number of beds (>400), are less likely be rewarded; in terms of ownership,
we find that voluntary non profit hospitals are more likely be rewarded; in terms of demographic
factors, hospitals where the average household income are higher within the region are more
likely be rewarded.
The third essay studies the opposite of regulation—deregulation effect. Price regulation is
common practice in drug markets with the hope of containing drug price from increasing too
rapidly. In terms of drug price regulation, two mechanisms are commonly used: reference pricing
and price cap. According to a report by WHO (2015), 24 of 30 OECD countries and 20 of 27
European Union countries use the reference price regulation to control drug price. UK and China
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adopted the price cap regulation system. But since pharmaceutical spending continues to grow
despite of price regulation, recently there are many callings to de-regulate. Since June 1st, 2015,
Chinese government decided to remove price cap regulation in pharmaceutical market and offers
us an opportunity to study the effect of de-regulation. In this essay, I applied an Interrupted Time
Series Analysis (ITSA) approach to study the effect of de-regulation of price cap in China`s
pharmaceutical market. Data is obtained from Sinopharm Group, the largest distributor in
China`s pharmaceutical market. A total of nine categories of drugs were analyzed and the results
showed a clear pattern between industry HHI and revenue change of the drugs. The results
showed that, whether the revenue of drugs will increase or decrease after the deregulation of
price cap depends on the level of competition and the change of patterns of the branded and
generic drugs are different. When HHI is sufficiently low (competition is high), revenue does not
change as a result of deregulation, when HHI is moderately low (moderate competition), revenue
from generic drugs will decrease significantly and revenue from branded drugs will increase
significantly, when HHI is high (low competition), revenue from generic drugs will increase
significantly and revenue from branded drugs will decrease significantly.
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CHAPTER TWO:
THE ROLE OF PATIENT SATISFACTION IN HOSPITALS` MEDICARE
REIMBURSEMENTS
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INTRODUCTION
In 1998, the Institute of Medicine formed The Committee on Quality of Health Care in
America aimed at developing a strategy for its improvement. This committee prepared two
reports that have driven many of the changes in healthcare in the past two decades. The first
report, “To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System” published in 2000, aimed at
improving the safety of healthcare provided in the US. The second report published in 2001,
“Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century,” outlined a
framework for improving the quality of healthcare (Lindsay 2017). It highlighted the physician
and hospital payment system as a big cause of quality problems in healthcare and a barrier to
health reform. In the Medicare program, clinicians had perverse incentives to focus on doing
more rather than doing better. Since this report, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
(CMS) has gradually moved in the direction of a more value-based pay-for-performance (P4P)
system requiring hospitals to evaluate and demonstrate service delivery effectiveness (Lee et al.
2017).
In 2010, as a part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) CMS
introduced the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (HVBP) program. It connected the Medicare
payment system directly to patient care delivery and perceived quality measures. The program's
purpose was to reduce cost and improve healthcare quality. To do so, Medicare imposed
reimbursement penalties or provided reimbursement bonuses based on a hospital’s annual quality
measures and actual healthcare outcomes in prior years (Lee et al. 2017). It went into effect in
fiscal year 2013 and is mandatory for all acute-care hospitals, public and private, in the US
except hospitals in Maryland which operate under a different all-payer model. Under HVBP
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program, Medicare withholds a percentage of its reimbursements (starting with 1 percent in 2013
and increasing by a quarter percent each year to reach the target of 2 percent in 2017) from
hospitals that do not perform well on a set of pre-specified healthcare quality measures.
Hospitals that do perform well receive reimbursement bonuses. It is a budget-neutral program
such that the total amounts of the rewards and penalties are equal. In 2018, the HVBP funding
pool held an estimated $1.9 billion. (Lee et al. 2017).
Over the years, the program’s emphasis gradually shifted from process-based quality
measures toward outcome-based quality measures. In the first year of HVBP 70 percent of the
measures were process measures, whereas now it rewards or penalizes hospitals based on their
performance on multiple domains of care, including clinical processes, clinical outcomes (i.e.,
30-day mortality rate), cost efficiencies (i.e., cost per discharge), and patient satisfaction
(Figueroa et al. 2016b). The evidence for effectiveness of this program in improving the
specified quality measures is mixed.
Patient satisfaction, which carries a weight of 25 percent in the HVBP payment formula,
is obtained from the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems
(HCAHPS) survey, which is the first national, standardized, publicly reported survey of patients’
experience of hospital care. Although inducted into the HVBP program in 2012 only, the survey
data have been collected since 2006 and publicly reported since 2008 (Tefera, Lehrman, and
Conway 2016).
The HCAHPS survey asks patients about their recent hospital stay and attempts to score
their overall experience and eight specific dimensions of their experience of care. One of these
dimensions is patient perception of the quality of pain care during hospitalization. Research has
shown that managing patient expectations about pain during and after surgical procedures can
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reduce patients’ distress, reduce the number of signs and symptoms, and improve their functional
status. It can also result in positive emotional outcomes for patients such as a decrease in anxiety
and depression and an increase in a sense of well-being (Glowacki 2015). However, many
healthcare providers expressed concern about the questions on pain management in the survey
saying that these questions wrongly equated pain management with prescription of a painkiller
(Lowes 2016).1 They reported feeling pressured to prescribe opioids to boost their hospital's
survey scores and, in turn, their hospital’s reimbursements. The American Hospital Association
was among several prominent healthcare associations asking CMS to stop considering pain
management questions in the HCAHPS survey when calculating payments under HVBP program
(Dickson 2016). According to this school of thought incentivizing aggressive pain management
has contributed to the overprescribing of opioids in the US and to the country’s larger struggle
with opioid addiction and overdose (Hall Render 2016).
In response to these concerns and to remove any perceived incentives of prescribing
opioids, in July 2016 CMS announced that pain management questions of the HCAHPS survey
will no more be considered in HVBP calculation. CMS has however stressed that robust pain
control is an appropriate part of routine inpatient care and it is conducting research to see if the
HCAHPS survey is indeed associated with the opioid epidemic. Depending on the findings, it
may develop new questions to bring back pain dimension in HVBP calculation in future (Hall
Render 2016).
In this paper, we utilized analytics tools to study the effectiveness of HVBP program at
improving patient satisfaction. Most of the existing studies in this domain fail to account for
wide heterogeneity of more than three thousand HVBP hospitals when comparing them to a
small control group of less than fifty non-HVBP hospitals in Maryland. Furthermore, a large
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number of studies depend on one year of data only to observe changes in quality measures. We
address both these limitations by collecting data over multiple years and employing propensity
score matching to obtain a matched treatment group of HVBP hospitals before comparing them
with the control group of hospitals in Maryland.
We integrated multi-year data from six diverse publicly available large data sources:
patient satisfaction data from Hospital Compare database of CMS, clinical measures and clinical
outcomes data from Medicare website, cost efficiency data from Hospital Inpatient Prospective
Payment System (IPPS) of CMS, hospital characteristics from CMS Impact Files, and
demographic data from the 2010 US census. Then we utilized difference-in-difference estimation
framework to see if HVBP program actually led to improvement in patient satisfaction at the
treatment group of hospitals compared with control group of hospitals. Our findings show that
the only dimension of patient satisfaction that showed significant improvement is patient
experience with pain management during hospitalization. After removal of this measure from
penalty and bonus calculation, the HVBP program is essentially rendered ineffective at
improving patient satisfaction, which is one of the key goals of the program.
We suggest two divergent paths for CMS to address this. Either CMS should again start
including pain management in the HVBP payment formula. To address the potential association
between these questions and opioid prescriptions, it should separately track opioid prescriptions
at each hospital. Alternatively, CMS should completely remove patient satisfaction measures
from HVBP program. Doing so will allow hospitals to focus their resources and attention back
on clinical processes and outcomes. It will also deliver cost savings for CMS by getting rid of
administering the survey and gathering responses from more than three million patients every
year.
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BACKGROUND
Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (HVBP) Program
CMS took the next step in these efforts in 2010. As a part of the Affordable Care Act
(ACA), it introduced the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (HVBP) program to improve
healthcare quality and reduce costs. The program went into effect in fiscal year 2013 and is
mandatory for all acute care hospitals, public and private, in the US except hospitals in
Maryland, which operate under a different all-payer model. In this program, Medicare imposes
reimbursement penalties or provides reimbursement bonuses based on a hospital’s performance
on a set of pre-defined quality measures. Medicare withholds a percentage of its reimbursements
(starting with 1 percent in 2013 and increasing by a quarter percent each year to reach the target
of 2 percent in 2017) from hospitals that do not perform well and distributes this money as
performance bonus to hospitals that perform well on its quality measures. Hence, it is intended to
be a budget-neutral program.
The Total Performance Score (TPS), which is used as the basis for calculation of
reimbursement bonus or penalty, comprises four dimensions of healthcare delivery: clinical
processes, clinical outcomes (i.e., 30-day mortality rate), cost efficiencies (i.e., cost per
discharge), and patient satisfaction. Half of the score is based on clinical measures with clinical
outcomes contributing 40 percent to the total score and clinical processes contributing 10
percent. The rest of the score is obtained equally from cost efficiency and patient satisfaction
(i.e., patient experience of care) with both contributing 25 percent each. Whereas other
dimensions of care delivery are objective, patient satisfaction is obtained from a survey named
the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS). The
survey is composed of 32 questions and is administered to a random sample of adult inpatients
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between 48 hours and 6 weeks after discharge from short-term, acute care hospitals (Tefera and
Lehrman 2017). It is the first national, standardized, publicly reported survey of patients’
experience of hospital care. Each hospital in the program gets two sets of scores on each of the
four dimensions – one for achievement (hospital’s own performance compared with the 50th
percentile of all hospitals’ performance) and one for improvement (hospital’s performance
compared with its own performance in the previous period). The higher of the two scores on
each dimension is utilized in the calculation of TPS which is a weighted average of the four
dimensions.
Inclusion of patient experience of care or patient satisfaction has led to a vigorous debate
in the industry. Advocates for inclusion of patient satisfaction contend that it measures critical
components of care that only patients can report, such as whether pain was addressed effectively
or if patients received clear communication from physicians and nurses. This makes it an
essential measure of how well a health care system functions. In an industry where the patient
should be the primary focus, the content of their experiences can help clinicians to better
mobilize around their needs. This builds trust in the healthcare system from the perspective of
the patient and promotes collaborative practices between clinicians and patients (Chatterjee et al.
2015). Prior studies in multiple healthcare settings have shown that poor patient satisfaction with
the health care system is associated with slower recovery from illness and a lower likelihood of
compliance with prescribed treatment regimens. Consequently, suboptimal patient experience
has important implications not only for the health of patients but also for health care costs, which
increase when patients use more health care services because of poor recovery and noncompliance (Chatterjee et al. 2012). When patients have a better experience, they are more likely
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to comply with treatments, return for follow-up appointments, and engage with the healthcare
system by seeking appropriate care (Chatterjee et al. 2015).
Critics of including patient satisfaction in HVBP program argue that doing so is driving
physicians to focus on the wrong priorities whereby hospitals end up behaving as hotels. Using
patient satisfaction as a metric shifts provider attention away from delivering technically
effective care to fulfilling patient expectations and demands (Chatterjee et al. 2015). By
conflicting with the clinical practice guidelines higher patient satisfaction, in fact, may be
associated with a higher rate of inpatient admissions, higher overall healthcare costs, and
increased mortality. For example, providing a prescription may result in a satisfied patient but
increase the cost of care and may contribute to ills such as antibiotic resistance and opioid crisis
(Lindsay 2017).
Pain Management under HVBP and the Opioid Crisis
Within the broad criticism of including patient satisfaction, one item in particular has
come under harsh scrutiny. The HCAHPS survey asks patients about their recent hospital stay
and attempts to score nine dimensions of the experience of care they received. One of these
dimensions is patient perception of the quality of pain management care during hospitalization.
In 2016, approximately 100 million people suffered from pain in the US out of which 9 to
12 million complained of chronic pain. Others reported short-term pain from injuries, diseases,
or medical procedures (Stoicea et al. 2019). Not managing patient expectations about pain during
and after surgical procedures can result in poorer clinical and psychological outcomes for the
patients. Patients in pain also have negative perceptions of healthcare they receive. Egbert et al.
(1964) reported that patients who received pain education required 50 percent fewer narcotics
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during hospitalization and were discharged sooner than patients who did not receive pain
education (cf. Glowacki 2015).
In 1996 the American Pain Society labeled pain as the “fifth vital sign” and developed a
national quality improvement program emphasizing measurable patient outcomes of effective
pain management such as decreased length of stay, reduced hospital costs, and increased patient
satisfaction (Glowacki 2015). In 2000, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations released new pain management standards that asserted that pain control was a
patient’s right, highlighted it as a perceived gap in clinician education and training, encouraged
an aggressive approach to pain assessment, and emphasized safe pain management (Chidgey et
al. 2019). The commission established that both acute and chronic pain were major causes of
patients’ dissatisfaction in the US health care system (Glowacki 2015).
In 2010, the HVBP program instituted reforms that included ﬁnancial incentives for
higher patient satisfaction scores. Patient satisfaction is strongly associated with their
perspectives on management of signs and symptoms of their condition. They are more likely to
experience dissatisfaction if they perceive a lack of validation in their pain experience or
negative attitudes from their providers (Glowacki 2015). The HCAHPS survey contained three
questions focused on pain management. Some physicians expressed concern that the questions
wrongly equated pain management with prescription of a painkiller (Lowes 2016). These
questions placed pressure on hospital staff to prescribe more opioids in order to achieve higher
scores on the survey (Hall Render 2016). Furthermore, patients complete the survey during a
time when many are filling post-discharge opioid prescriptions. This timing could also
inadvertently incentivize providers to overprescribe opioids after discharge to ensure satisfactory
ratings (Lee et al. 2017). Although pain management may constitute only a small part of the
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survey but respondents do not necessarily separate out with which piece of the experience they
were unhappy. If they were in pain and the hospital did not give them a painkiller despite their
request, they may conclude that the hospital did not take good care of them. This can affect their
responses to the whole HCAHPS survey (Tefera and Lehrman 2016). Thus, many physicians
said they felt pressured to overprescribe opioids to boost their hospital's survey scores and, in
turn, their hospital's reimbursements.
The Opioid Crisis
The current opioid crisis started taking shape in the 1990s. From the late 1990s until
2012, opioid prescriptions written each year in the US steadily rose to an annual peak of 225
million (Chidgey et al. 2019). Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reports that deaths
attributable to prescription opioids more than tripled in the US during the 1999-2014 period
(Dickson and Blesch 2016; Jena et al. 2016). Around 6 percent of the US population (15 to 64
years old) reported some type of opioid abuse in 2015, and more than 42,000 people died of
opioid overdose in 2016 alone (Stoicea et al. 2019; Volkow et al. 2019).
Prescribing opioids at the time of discharge from an acute hospitalization represents an
important but under-described potential avenue through which patients may develop long-term
use of opioids. Use of opioids during and shortly after hospitalization is warranted in some
clinical settings such as in patients undergoing surgery. Opioids are “powerful pain-reducing
medications” which administered at appropriate doses are effective at not only eliminating pain
but also further preventing its recurrence in long-term recovery scenarios (Stoicea et al. 2019).
Failure to appropriately manage pain in such cases may delay discharge from the hospital,
interfere in postoperative rehabilitation, and in general adversely affect patient’s quality of life.
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However, use of opioids is also associated with both short- and long-term risks including
developing dependence (Jena et al. 2016).
Opioid overprescribing has been frequently identified as a major cause of the current
opioid crisis (Chidgey et al. 2019). Overprescribing has been attributed to misinformation and
outside pressure from both pharmaceutical companies and accreditation bodies such as the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations. Caught between regulatory
requirements aimed at eliminating pain and aggressive marketing campaigns along with a shift in
cultural beliefs about pain control, physicians became unwitting accomplices in the opioid crisis
(Chidgey et al. 2019). In fact, the Promoting Responsible Opioid Prescribing Act of 2016
suggested that the pain management measure in HCAHPS survey could have incentivized both
greater inpatient use of opioids and the prescribing of opioids at the time of discharge (Jena et al.
2016).
Another school of thought believes the evidence on the link between the HCAHPS
survey and opioid prescription is inconclusive. For example, a study conducted in Michigan
found no correlation between postoperative opioid prescribing and scores on HCAHPS pain
measures (Lee et al. 2017). A coalition that included several pain-medicine societies such as the
American Pain Society and the American Academy of Pain Medicine lobbied the CMS to retain
the three questions; at least until better ones were drafted. They warned that in the absence of any
conclusive evidence, eliminating pain-related questions would be a step back in proper pain
management. It would deprive researchers of valuable data that could improve pain management
(Lowes 2016).
CMS also offered defense of its decision to include patient perception of pain
management in HCAHPS survey, and consequently in HVBP program. Historical data shows
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that the sharp increase in opioid prescription in mid-1990s coincided with the conceptualization
of “Pain as the 5th Vital Sign” by the American Pain Society, and pharmaceutical industry’s
campaign to falsely detail opioid prescribing as safe, reasonable, and effective for chronic pain
while downplaying the risks of opioid dependence, abuse, and overdose. The crisis thus began
years before the HCAHPS Survey was launched in 2006. There is no noticeable acceleration in
opioid prescription in 2006 or in 2008, when public reporting of hospital scores started (Tefera
and Lehrman 2017).
Regarding the use of HCAHPS survey, CMS is not aware of any empirical evidence that
physicians prescribe opioids to inpatients with an intention to obtain better scores on the pain
management questions, or patients who receive opioids rate their hospital experience more
positively than those who do not (Tefera and Lehrman 2016). Nothing in the survey suggests that
opioids are a preferred way to control pain. In fact, good nurse and physician communication, a
critical issue from the patient perspective, are strongly associated with better HCAHPS scores
(Tefera, Lehrman, and Conway 2016). There is no evidence that experience with pain
management dominates patients’ overall assessment of their hospital experience. Moreover, the
way HCAHPS survey contributes to HVBP makes the pain management dimension negligible as
far as its impact on the overall payment to the hospital – it is one of the eight equally weighted
dimensions of patient satisfaction and determines less than one-tenth of one percent of total
payment to the hospital (Tefera and Lehrman 2016). In fact, patients diagnosed with substance
abuse disorders are not included for the scoring of HVBP (Dickson and Blesch 2016).
Nonetheless, bowing to consistent criticism from healthcare providers, in July 2016 CMS
announced the pain management questions of the HCAHPS survey will not be considered in
HVBP to remove any perceived incentives of prescribing opioids. Given the complexity of the
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issue straddling two national challenges – of adequate pain management and opioid
overprescribing – and the need for additional research, CMS will continue to survey patients
about pain management and provide participating hospitals with valuable patient feedback.
However, these pain dimension results are not a part of the HVBP calculation (Tefera and
Lehrman 2017).
Empirical Evidence for Effectiveness of HVBP program
HVBP program was instituted with an intention to improve healthcare outcomes and
patient experience and reduce costs. However, evidence about the effectiveness of the program
to achieve these goals is mixed.
A study comparing data in HCAHPS surveys in 2008 and 2009 found improvements in
all measures in patient experience except doctors’ communication (Elliott et al. 2010). Staff
responsiveness and whether patients received discharge information saw the largest
improvements. Westbrook et al. (2014) used factor analysis to show that all dimensions of
HCAHPS survey except discharge information significantly influenced patient satisfaction.
However, the study was based on data from two hospitals only. A study using difference-indifference estimation methodology found that participating hospitals did not show significant
improvement in any of the quality measures (Ryan et al. 2015). Some studies have compared
participating hospitals in HVBP program with various control groups to see if the program made
a relative difference in the quality of healthcare they deliver. A study comparing the participating
hospitals to critical-care hospitals and hospitals in Maryland (these two categories of hospitals
are not required to participate in HVBP) found no improvement in clinical outcomes as measured
by 30-day mortality rates (Figueroa et al. 2016a). Another study comparing the participating
hospitals to critical-care hospitals found no significant differences in the improvement in clinical
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processes and patient experience across the two groups (Ryan et al. 2017). Papanicolas et al.
(2017) found only moderate improvement in patient experience among HVBP hospitals but even
this improvement had occurred mostly before the intervention period.
Several other studies have compared groups of hospitals based on some underlying
characteristics and demonstrated that while one group shows an improvement the other does not.
For example, Jha et al. (2008) found substantial differences in the patients’ experiences across
different geographical regions which they attributed to the style of caregiving and organizational
leadership. A study using data from 2009 to 2011 found that hospitals catering largely to older
white female patients who underwent relatively fewer procedures did better under the program
(Johnston et al. 2015). These hospitals were predominantly non-teaching smaller urban hospitals
owned by the government or religious organizations. Another study comparing penalty or reward
status of safety net hospitals’ with other hospitals’ using data from year 2014 found that safetynet hospitals were more likely to be penalized under the HVBP program (Gilman et al. 2015;
Joynt, Zuckerman, and Epstein 2017).
A large number of these studies suffer from two limitations that could have biased their
results. First, a number of them used data for a single year only which is not sufficient to capture
the evolving dynamics in processes and outcomes of healthcare quality. Multiple years of data
are required to capture any improvement. Second, most studies do not account for heterogeneity
in HVBP hospitals when comparing them to a small control group of hospitals. Comparing more
than three thousand hospitals under HVBP, which have a broad range of unique hospital and
geo-locational characteristics with a small group of less than fifty hospitals all of which are
located in Maryland can lead to biased results. Ideally, one should first obtain a matching sample
of treatment group (i.e., hospitals participating in HVBP) before comparing them with the
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control group so that one can minimize the role of hospital characteristics in any changes in their
healthcare delivery quality.
In this study, we address both these limitations. We employ multiple years of data for
model estimation and use propensity score matching to obtain a matched treated group of HVBP
hospitals to compare with control group of hospitals in Maryland.
METHODOLOGY
Data
Using analytics tools we integrated multi-year data from six diverse publicly available
large data source: patient satisfaction data from HCAHPS, clinical measures and clinical
outcomes data from Medicare website, cost efficiency data from Hospital Inpatient Prospective
Payment System (IPPS) of CMS, hospital characteristics from CMS Impact Files, and
demographic data from the 2010 US census.
Main variables of interest related to patient satisfaction in HCAHPS survey are obtained
from the Hospital Compare data from years 2011 to 2015 available at CMS website. All shortterm, acute-care, non-specialty hospitals including hospitals in Maryland are required to
participate in the survey. The survey is a 27-item tool administered after discharge to a random
sample of adult inpatients, creating standardized, publicly reported measures that allow fair
comparisons of patient experience in hospitals across the nation. The 9 HCAHPS measures
derived from the survey reported on the Hospital Compare website assess physicians’ and
nurses’ quality of communication, responsiveness of hospital staff to patient needs, quality of
pain management, communication about medication, required information at the time of
discharge, cleanliness and quietness of patient rooms, and overall rating (Lindsay 2017). The
survey is administered by hospitals or their contracted vendors who send the data to the CMS,
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which validates, analyzes, and publicly reports the results. The scores that CMS reports reﬂect
hospital-level patient experience during a 12-month period (Tefera and Lehrman 2017). The
survey is widely used with more than 31,000 patients across 4,100 participating hospitals every
day. After removal of ineligible patients, the survey has a 30 percent response rate that translates
to 8,500 surveys completed daily. Meta-analyses have established that there is no nonresponse
bias in the survey. Because HCAHPS adjusts for patient characteristics, the data provide
statistically valid results that may help inform patient’s choice of hospital and drive quality
improvement at the hospital level. The official HCAHPS scores reported on the CMS Hospital
Compare website are based on 3.1 million completed surveys each year (Tefera, Lehrman, and
Conway 2016).
We obtained clinical measures and clinical outcomes data from Medicare website
(medicare.gov). The dataset named “Complications and Deaths – Hospital” provides clinical
outcomes as evaluated by the HVBP program – 30-day mortality rates for pneumonia, heart
attack, and heart failure patients. The dataset named “Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (HVBP)
– Clinical Care Domain Scores” provides clinical process scores.
Cost efficiency data are obtained from Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment System
(IPPS) of CMS. It provides a summary of hospital overall cost and total number of discharges
from which cost per discharge was calculated.
Characteristics of hospitals such as the number of beds, the number of employees,
resident-to-bed ratio, case mix index, number of discharges, and locational data are obtained
from CMS Impact Files. According to CMS, the impact files are “generally prepared in the
summer preceding the Federal fiscal year and are based on the best data available at the time.
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The files are used in estimating payment impacts of various policy changes to the IPPS proposed
and finalized in the Federal Register.”
Demographic data were obtained from the 2010 US census available at census.gov and
matched with each hospital by 10-mile radius within the zip code.
To evaluate the effectiveness of HVBP program while also overcoming the limitations of
existing research as mentioned earlier, we took several steps. We obtained data from 2011 to
2015, which was the last full year before CMS announced that pain management questions
would no longer be used in HVBP calculations. Using multiple years of data allow us to capture
improvement in various quality measures.
Propensity Score Matching
We used propensity score matching to obtain a matched treated group of HVBP hospitals
to compare with control group of hospitals in Maryland.
Previous research has shown that various measures of hospital performance may be
correlated with such factors as hospital characteristics and socio-economic characteristics in
hospital’s vicinity. For example, patients of different races or ethnicities tend to rate their
satisfaction level toward a hospital very differently (Weech-Maldonado et al. 2003). Even
aggregate patient characteristics such as gender, household income, and health status
significantly affect the satisfaction rating of hospitals (Haviland et al. 2005; Weech-Maldonado
et al. 2003). Clinical outcome measures such as mortality rates have been shown as significantly
higher at for-profit hospitals (Hartz et al. 1989) and at major teaching hospitals while
significantly lower at large urban hospitals (Keeler et al. 1992). Thus, comparing all the HVBP
hospitals, which are heterogeneous with respect to these characteristics, with a small
geographically concentrated control group can lead to biased findings.
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We used hospitals in Maryland as a control group because Maryland does not participate
in HVBP program. The Medicare waiver (codified in Section 1814(b) of the Social Security Act)
exempted Maryland from the Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS) and Outpatient
Prospective Payment System (OPPS) and allowed it to set rates for these services. Given the
long-standing Medicare waiver for its own rate setting system, Maryland`s hospitals are
exempted from the Medicare VBP program and operate on all-payer hospital rate regulation
system. It thus allows for the most obvious choice as a control group for the purpose of
comparison.
We used nearest-neighbor propensity score matching to obtain a group of HVBP
hospitals comparable to hospitals in the control group. To avoid problem of endogeneity, we
based this matching on a set of characteristics that are not subject to change due to participation
in the HVBP program. These included hospital ownership (government owned, voluntary nonprofit, or proprietary), geo-location (large urban, other urban, or rural) and socio-economic
characteristics within 10 mile radius of the hospital (white population, black population,
Hispanic population, number of males and females, and average household income).
The dataset contains 45 hospitals from Maryland. However, five hospitals did not meet
the minimum data requirement established by CMS for valid results; CMS requires a minimum
of 100 surveys from patients of a hospital to report clinical quality measures. Five hospitals did
not pass this threshold hence we used the remaining 40 hospitals in Maryland as our control
group. We employed one-to-one nearest neighbor matching to form a treatment group of 40
HVBP hospitals. As figure 2.1 shows, overlap of control group’s propensity scores is
significantly better with scores of matched treated group of HVBP hospitals than with scores of
all HVBP hospitals.
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[----------Figure 2.1 about here----------]
Figure 2.2 presents the comparison between the three groups of hospitals from 2011 to
2015 on clinical outcomes (30-day mortality rates), cost efficiency (cost per discharge), clinical
process (conformance quality), and three dimensions of patient satisfaction namely overall
experience, nurse communication, and pain experience. This comparison clearly demonstrates
the bias that can afflict findings from studies comparing all the HVBP hospitals to a control
group of hospitals.
[----------Figure 2. 2 about here----------]
Table 2.1 presents a detailed comparison of various characteristics of both treatment and
control groups as well as all HVBP hospitals in FY 2011. This comparison further validates the
importance of obtaining a matched group of hospitals before making the comparison with a
control group of hospitals. Obtaining a matched treated group using propensity scores can help
reduce the selection bias and strengthen causal arguments.
[----------Table 2.1 about here----------]
Model Estimation and Results
We perform a difference-in-difference estimation for the effectiveness of HVBP program
using the data on 40 hospitals each from treated group and control group. We specify the
following model:
𝒚𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛽𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝒖𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡

where
𝒚𝑖𝑡 is a vector of the average score of each performance measure for hospital i at time t,

𝐷𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if time is after the institution of HVBP program (i.e.,
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after 2013) and the hospital participates in the HVBP program, 0 otherwise,
𝛽 is the coefficient for the 𝐷𝑖𝑡 which indicates if there is a significant difference in the

performance measures of hospitals belonging to two groups after the institution of the program,
𝒖𝑖𝑡 is a vector of characteristics for each hospital i at time t controlled for in the model,

𝛼𝑖 is the hospital unit fixed effects,
𝜆𝑡 is the time fixed effects,
𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the error term.

We estimated this model to compare both the matched group of HVBP hospitals as well
as the entire set of all HVBP hospitals with the control group. Results from both estimations
show that patient perception of pain management is the only quality measure that showed
consistent significant improvement in HVBP hospitals (βMatched = 1.46; p < .01 and βAll = .77; p
< .05) (see table 2.2). There is no significant difference in any other quality measure across the
two groups of hospitals in matched samples.
[----------Table 2.2 about here----------]
Overall, our results suggest that out of four broad quality measures utilized in HVBP
there was no significant improvement in clinical processes, clinical outcomes, or cost efficiency
when compared with control group of hospitals located in Maryland which did not participate in
the program. In patient satisfaction too, the only factor that showed significant improvement was
patient perception of pain management during hospitalization.
Sensitivity Analysis
The key assumption behind diff-in-diff framework is: In the absence of treatment, the
average change in the response variable would have been the same for both the treatment and
control groups (parallel trends). As is pointed out by Ashenfelter (1978), one concern in diff-in-
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diff study is that, there is often a “dip” in outcomes (earnings, employment, etc.) in the period
before the treatment. For example, people lose their jobs just before joining the treated group and
the people in the control group don`t. A pre-treatment “dip” or “trend” that is special to the
treated units would lead to biased estimates. To test this, I applied the method used by Autor
(2003) by estimating treatment impacts at the timings before real treatment happens (including
leads in the estimation framework), if the treatment effect is significant in previous years, it
shows that there is a slope change for the units that are about to become treated and it is a sign of
violation of the parallel trends assumption (sometimes called a modified “Granger Causality”
test). Another extension I made here is to include lags of treatment. Lags are included to analyze
whether the treatment effect changes over time after treatment.

𝒚𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛽−1 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1 𝐷𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝜂𝒖𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡
where
𝒚𝑖𝑡 is a vector of the average score of each performance measure for hospital i at time t,

𝐷𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if time is the institution of HVBP program (i.e., 2013)
and the hospital participates in the HVBP program, 0 otherwise,
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if time is one year before the institution of HVBP
program (i.e., 2012) and the hospital participates in the HVBP program, 0 otherwise,
𝐷𝑖,𝑡+1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if time is one year after the institution of HVBP
program (i.e., 2014) and the hospital participates in the HVBP program, 0 otherwise,
𝛽 is the coefficient for the 𝐷𝑖𝑡 which indicates if there is a significant difference in the

performance measures of hospitals belonging to two groups after the institution of the program,
𝛽−1 is the coefficient for 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 which indicates if there is a significant difference in the
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performance measures of hospitals belonging to two groups one year before the institution of the
program (sign of violation of the parallel trend assumption),
𝛽1 is the coefficient for 𝐷𝑖,𝑡+1 which indicates if there is a significant difference in the

performance measures of hospitals belonging to two groups one year after the institution of the
program,
𝛼𝑖 is the hospital unit fixed effects,
𝜆𝑡 is the time fixed effects,
𝒖𝑖𝑡 is a vector of characteristics for each hospital i at time t controlled for in the model, and
𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the error term.

We estimated this model to compare the matched group of HVBP hospitals with the control
group. Results from estimations show that the estimation of patient perception of pain
management is valid (𝛽−1 is not significant).
[----------Table 2.3 about here----------]
Robustness Check
We tested for the robustness of our findings by obtaining matched groups of HVBP
hospitals using other propensity score matching methods and re-estimating our models using
these matched groups. The nearest neighbor matching method is a “greedy” method, in which the
closest control unit for each treated unit is chosen one at a time, without trying to minimize the
global distance measure. Hence, one could argue that the matched group of hospitals may still
differ significantly from the control group in underlying characteristics.
We used two other propensity score matching methods – optimal matching and genetic
matching – to obtain matched group of hospitals and re-estimated our model. Optimal matching
method locates the matched units with the smallest average absolute distance across all the
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matched pairs. It can be particularly useful when there may not be an appropriately matched
control unit for a treated unit. Genetic matching, on the other hand, is a general multivariate
matching method that automates the process of finding a good matching group. It is a
generalization of propensity score and Mahalanobis distance matching. The idea is to use a
genetic search algorithm to find a set of weights for the covariates to maximize the balance
between matched treated and control units. The main advantage of this method is that it
optimizes covariate balance directly. We used the same set of characteristics as in nearest
neighbor method to match the groups in optimal and genetic matching too. Next, we used the
two matched treated groups along with the control group of hospitals in Maryland to repeat
difference-in-difference analysis using the same set of covariates. The results shown in table 2.4
are consistent in showing that the only measure that significantly differs between the two groups
is patient perception of pain management.
[----------Table 2.4 about here----------]
CONCLUSION
In 2010, as a part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) CMS
introduced a pay-for-performance system called Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (HVBP)
program. The purpose was to reduce costs and improve healthcare quality by linking the
Medicare payment system directly to a pre-defined set of quality measures. It went into effect in
fiscal year 2013 and covered all acute-care hospitals except those in Maryland. The program
calculates each hospital’s bonus or penalty based on their performance on four domains of care:
clinical processes, clinical outcomes (i.e., 30-day mortality rate), cost efficiency (i.e., cost per
discharge), and patient satisfaction. Patient satisfaction, which carries a weight of 25 percent in
the formula, is obtained from the HCAHPS survey. Besides other dimensions of patient
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satisfaction, this survey captures patient experience with pain management during
hospitalization. This pain management dimension has come under criticism because some
physicians have reported feeling pressured to prescribe opioid painkillers to boost their hospital's
survey scores and, in turn, their hospital’s reimbursements. This is thought to have contributed to
the overprescribing of opioids in the US and, consequently, to the opioid crisis. In response to
this criticism and to remove any perceived incentives of prescribing opioids, in July 2016 CMS
announced that pain management questions of the HCAHPS survey will no more be considered
in HVBP calculation.
In this paper, we studied the effectiveness of HVBP program at improving patient
satisfaction. Using analytics tools we collected data over multiple years and employed propensity
score matching to obtain a matched treatment group of HVBP hospitals to compare with the
control group of hospitals in Maryland. Then we utilized difference-in-difference estimation
framework to see if HVBP program actually led to improvement in patient satisfaction at the
treatment group of hospitals compared with control group of hospitals. Our findings show that
the only dimension of patient satisfaction that showed significant improvement is patient
experience with pain management during hospitalization. In fact, other components of the
payment formula – clinical processes, clinical outcomes, and cost efficiency – also showed no
significant improvement under HVBP program. These findings are broadly consistent with a
number of other studies that have failed to show any improvement in quality measures after
HVBP introduction.
After removal of this measure from penalty and bonus calculation, the HVBP program is
essentially rendered ineffective at improving patient satisfaction, which is one of the key goals of
the program. We suggest two divergent paths for CMS to address this. Either CMS should again
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start including pain management in the HVBP payment formula. In fact, the redesigned pain
management questions that CMS used in 2019 seem suitable for re-inclusion in the formula: they
have no apparent link to prescription of a painkiller.2 This change can remove any perceived
pressure on the physicians to prescribe opioids and allow them to choose the best option for a
patient in their particular situation. That best option may be non-pharmaceutical, a non-opioid
pharmaceutical, or even an opioid (Tefera and Lehrman 2016). Additionally, to lay at rest any
potential suspect association between even these new questions and opioid prescriptions, CMS
should separately track opioid prescriptions at each hospital. Given that the rates of fatalities due
to opioid overdose vary markedly by state (Volkow et al. 2019), a one-size-fits-all decision of
removing pain management anyway may not be optimal.
Alternatively, CMS should completely remove patient satisfaction measures from HVBP
program. Doing so will allow hospitals to focus their resources and attention back on clinical
processes and outcomes. It will also deliver cost savings for CMS by getting rid of administering
the survey and gathering responses from more than three million patients every year. Critics have
argued that HVBP program lacks design features of a successful pay-for-performance program.
It should be focused on a small number of high-value measures to motivate clinicians to engage
in good practice and have a simple enough design for hospitals and clinicians to know how they
are doing. The clinical outcomes and patient’s functional status are good choices for measures
that can be included or retained in the payment formula (Jha 2017). Given its ineffectiveness at
improving almost any health measure, HBVP should increase the stakes for hospitals by
increasing the performance penalty/bonus amount to 5 to 10 percent of total Medicare payments
of the hospital. That may be one way to focus hospital’s attention at improving health measures
(Jha 2017).
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FIGURES AND TABLES FOR CHAPTER TWO
Table 2.1: Characteristics of Hospitals in Various Groups (FY 2011)

Number of hospitals
Avg. number of hospital beds

All HVBP Matched HVBP
Hospitals
Hospitals
2912
40

Control
Group
40

200

282

268

Avg. number of hospital employees

1261

1835

1878

Avg. number of hospital discharges

9638

17786

16240

Percent of Medicare/Medicaid patients

49.5

54.2

53.5

Number of White residentsa

17.39

14.14

14.91

Number of Black residentsa

3.15

8.72

9.02

Number of Hispanic residentsa

4.15

2.28

1.67

Number of malesa

11.43

12.20

12.31

Number of femalesa

11.94

13.03

13.31

Avg. household income

44.90

55.92

55.89

Median age of males

33.06

33.60

32.48

Median age of females

35.38

35.85

34.84

.06

.07

.06

Avg. case mix index

1.45

1.43

1.42

Avg. overall patient experience score
Avg. nurse communication score
Avg. doctor communication score

70.6
77.2
80.2

69.6
74.2
78.4

66.1
73.8
77.4

Avg. staff responsiveness score

64.3

59.7

57.3

62.2
69.6
84.5
71.1
58.5
12.7
15441

57.8
67.0
79.7
69.1
55.6
12.2
15039

57.2
66.6
82.3
64.7
55.1
12.4
15279

95.5

96.6

94.5

Teaching status

Avg. medicine explanation score
Avg. pain management score
Avg. discharge information score
Avg. cleanliness score
Avg. quietness score
Avg. 30-day mortality rate
Avg. cost per discharge
Avg. clinical quality score
a
Values are in thousands.
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Table 2.2: Results from Difference-in-Difference Model Estimation

Performance measure
Doctor communication
Nurse communication
Staff responsiveness
Medicine explanation
Pain control
Discharge information
Cleanliness
Quietness
Mortality rate
Cost per discharge
Conformance quality
Note: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05

Matched HVBP Group
vs Control Group
Coeff.
S.E.
.64
.42
.93
.50
.91
.71
.67
.61
1.46***
.62
.47
−.35
1.14
.76
1.31
.87
.13
−.03
430.57
−385.32
.58
.64

All HVBP Group
vs Control Group
Coeff.
S.E.
.01
.03
.36
.32
1.04**
.47
.31
.47
.77**
.39
.29
−.34
.68
.45
.69
.46
.07
.09
773.94
13788
1.06
1.07
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Table 2.3: Results from Sensitivity Analysis

Performance measure
Doctor communication
Nurse communication
Staff responsiveness
Medicine explanation
Pain control
Discharge information
Cleanliness
Quietness
Mortality rate
Cost per discharge
Conformance quality

Matched HVBP Group vs
Control Group
𝛽−1
𝛽
-.52
.71
(.53)
(.52)
-.37
.94
(.62)
(.62)
-.20
1.46
(.86)
(.85)
.28
.74
(.90)
(.90)
.13
1.76*
(.78)
(.78)
.006
-.14
(.59)
(.59)
-.15
.74
(.96)
(.95)
-1.14
.13
(.85)
(.85)
.30*
.07
(.13)
(.13)
386.76
390.37
(379.76)
(378.72)
.13
.54
(.60)
(.61)

𝛽1
.36
(.56)
.08
(.66)
.53
(.91)
.63
(.96)
.42
(.83)
-.68
(.63)
.76
(.1.01)
1.14
(.90)
.05
(.14)
28.8
(402.29)
.25
(.61)

Note: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05

Table 2.4: Results from Difference-in-Difference Model Estimation Using Matched
Treated HVBP Hospitals vs Control Group

Performance measure
Doctor communication
Nurse communication
Staff responsiveness
Medicine explanation
Pain control
Discharge information
Cleanliness
Quietness
Mortality rate

Optimal
Propensity Matching
Coeff.
S.E.
.05
.52
.06
.59
.46
.92
.38
.67
1.24***
.48
.75
−.47
.81
−.08
.84
−.32
.06
.08

Genetic
Propensity Matching
Coeff.
S. E.
.29
.59
.21
.65
1.46
1.02
.22
.73
.90**
.42
.76
−.1.08
.78
.89
.58
.93
.12
−.05
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Cost per discharge
Conformance quality
Note: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05

360.64
−.15

341.75
1.47

−373.51
.75

372.76
1.62
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Figure 2.1: Propensity Scores Before and After Matching

Notes:
HVBP hospitals are the Treated group and Maryland hospitals are the control group.
Raw Treated group includes all HVBP hospitals; Matched Treated group includes 40 HVBP
hospitals obtained using propensity score matching.
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Figure 2.2: Comparison of Quality Measures Between Maryland Hospitals,
Matched HVBP Hospitals, and All HVBP Hospitals
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INTRODUCTION
Since FY 2013, as a part of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) program, the Hospital ValueBased Purchasing (HVBP) program adjusts Medicare`s payments to hospitals based on the total
performance score of the hospital. First, the program reduces a portion of the hospital`s Medicare
payments in a specific fiscal year and then by the end of the same fiscal year, the amount of the
payment reductions will be awarded to the hospitals based on the total performance score, thus
the hospitals that do not receive the reward will lose the portion of money reduced by Medicare.
In this research, the authors apply the theory of state dependence and use the dynamic random
effect probit model to estimate this effect. The results show that the hospital payment adjustment
dynamics have a very significant state dependence effect (0.341), that means, hospitals that
received a reward in previous year are 34.1% more probably to receive a reward this year than
the ones that received a penalty in previous year. Meanwhile, I also find that the state
dependence effect varies significantly across hospitals with different ownership
(proprietary/government owned/voluntary nonprofit), the results show that voluntary nonprofit
hospitals exhibit largest effect of state dependence (0.370), while government owned hospitals
exhibit lowest effect of state dependence (0.293) and proprietary hospitals are in the middle.
Among the factors that influence the likelihood a hospital receive a reward, I find that teaching
hospitals with large number of beds (>400), are less likely be rewarded; in terms of ownership, I
find that voluntary nonprofit hospitals are more likely be rewarded; in terms of demographic
factors, hospitals where the average household income are higher within the region are more
likely be rewarded.
BACKGROUND
State dependence effect, proposed by Heckman (1981), refers to the phenomenon that the
realization of an event affects the probability that the same event occurring in the future, it can be
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caused by two reasons. The first explanation is that, through experiencing a past event, certain
behavior, for example, preference of a consumer, R&D investment of a firm, are altered. In this
explanation, the past experience has a genuine behavioral effect that will lead the individual to
behave differently as opposed to the same individual who has not experienced that event.
Heckman termed this as “true state dependence” or “structural state dependence”. The second
explanation is that, individuals may differ in unobserved factors (for example, lack of
motivation, low level of capability) that affect their likelihood of experiencing an event (that has
nothing to do with whether an individual has experienced that event in the past or not). Heckman
termed this as “spurious state dependence”. In his paper, he also proposed a model to distinguish
between the true state dependence and spurious state dependence.
Heckman`s paper has aroused a lot of attention in economics, finance, health care and
other areas. Researchers studied this effect in labor force participation, unemployment
persistence and poverty/low pay persistence, dynamics of health, persistence of R&D
investment, etc. I list some phenomenon regarding state dependence effect studied before in this
literature part.
Effect of the VBP Program
Since the introduction of the CMS VBP program, it has aroused a lot of attention both
from practioners and researchers about the impact of the program. However, the results are
mixed, and the impact on different perspectives of the program are different. Ryan (2015)
studied the early effects of the VBP program, using a diff-in-diff framework, he compared the
hospital performance in terms of clinical quality and patient experience in 2012 with the baseline
period 2011 and found that, hospitals that are impacted by the VBP program show no
improvement in both dimensions (clinical quality and patient experience), he conclude that, in

43

the first implementation period (2011 to 2012), there is no improvement in hospital performance,
the reason could be that, the low magnitude and complex design of financial incentive. However,
this study suffers from the short study period (only 1 year), if the period is long enough, there
could be more improvements in hospital performance.
Figueroa (2016) studied the impact of VBP program on patient mortality of three
conditions (acute myocardial infraction, heart failure and pneumonia) using a total of 4267 acute
care hospitals in US, among them 1348 were not eligible to participate in the VBP program
(critical access hospitals and hospitals in Maryland). He found that, for the hospitals that were
impacted by the program, the mortality rates decreased at 0.13% and for the hospitals that were
not impacted by the program, the mortality rates dereased at 0.14%. The difference between the
mortality trend of the impacted and the non impacted hospitals was not significant. He concluded
that, there is a lack of evidence for that the VBP program will lead to a lower mortality rate and
he suggested alternative models to achieve a lower mortality rate.
Ryan (2017) further studied the impact of the VBP program in the first four years since
its introduction in terms of clinical quality, patient experience and mortality using a diff-in-diff
framework, where the critical access hospital (not eligible to participate in the program) is used
as a control group. The results show that the improvements on clinical care measures and patient
experience measures were not significant comparing the hospitals exposed to the VBP program
and the hospitals that are not exposed to the program. In terms of mortality rates, the reduction in
mortality rate of heart failure or acute myocardial infarction is not significant, while the
reduction in mortality of pneumonia is significant.
Bonfrer (2018) did an observational study comparing hospitals that volunteered to
participate in the Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration (PHQID, the pilot program

44

of VBP) and the hospitals whose incentives were implemented later in the VBP program. The
sample of study include 214 hospitals that were impacted by the PHQID program since 2003 and
975 matched hospitals that were impacted by the VBP program since 2013. Their results showed
that, early adopters and late adopters of the program did not differ significantly in terms of
clinical quality or mortality. They concluded that, being impacted for a longer time in the
program did not likely make the hospitals perform better.
Since the research on the effect of the VBP program largely show no or little
improvements on hospital performance, researchers began to investigate why the VBP program
is not effective, Markovitz (2017) reviewed the literature to assess whether area factors,
organizational and structural factors play a role in hospital performance. Their results showed
that, hospitals are not responding strategically to the incentives of the VBP program and the VBP
program needs to increase the financial incentive while at the same time clarify the incentive
structure. They also suggested that, although some heterogeneity across organization types may
mask the main effect of the program, the variation is not sufficient enough to alter the conclusion
that VBP program does not meet its original goal.
State Dependence, Unemployment and Poverty
A prominent example of the state dependence effect is unemployment persistence,
whether past experience of unemployment affect the likelihood of future unemployment. Lynch
(1985) examined the state dependence effect in youth unemployment and she found a significant
state dependence effect that past unemployment duration has on future unemployment. She
estimated that, a white male worker with mean values of expected income, given one week of
unemployment, has a re-employment probability of 36.09% comparing with only 8.4% if this
same individual has 10 weeks of unemployment experience.
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Narendranathan, Wiji, and Peter Elias (1993) studied whether there is a causal
relationship between past unemployment experience and future unemployment, they used a
sample of 4067 males born in 1958 and their employment history between the year 1974 and
1981 (seven years), duration of unemployment, and other socio-economic factors. The results
showed a significant state dependence effect, the probability of becoming unemployed are 2.3
times higher for people who were unemployed last year than for people who were not
unemployed. Among other factors, they found that the probability that an individual with a
below average math score will be unemployed this year is 1.8 times higher compared to an
individual who has an above average math score. With regard to reading scores, this figure is 1.6.
Also, comparing to the people who are not married, the people who are married are less likely
being unemployed.
Flaig, Licht and Steiner (1993) studied the state dependence effect in male
unemployment behavior with the first six waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel through a
dynamic random effect probit model. Their result showed a significant state dependence effect
regarding both incidence and duration of unemployment controlling for observed and
unobserved heterogeneity. The authors suggested a person`s previous unemployment history
have a long term effect because it leads to a depreciation of human capital or acts as a screening
device in future employers` hiring decisions.
Arulampalam, Booth and Taylor (2000) studied unemployment persistence with data
from British Household Panel Survey through a dynamic panel model, the econometric issues of
unobserved heterogeneity and initial conditions are discussed. They found a strong effect of state
dependence—an individual`s previous unemployment experience has effect on his future
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unemployment. They suggested that policies reducing short term unemployment incidence will
have long term effect on unemployment.
Later, Arulampalam (2001) further studied this effect and found that, not only did
previous unemployment experience has state dependence effect on future unemployment, but
also that previous unemployment experience will have an effect on wage received in the future.
The author estimated that an incidence of unemployment will lead to a wage penalty of about 6%
on re-employ in Britain, and three years later, they earned 14% less compared to what they
would have received in the absence of past unemployment.
Another often studied phenomenon that exhibits state dependence effect is low wage
employment and poverty persistence. Stewart and Swaffield (1999) studied the state dependence
effect in low pay dynamics, they found that the probability of being low paid strongly depends
on whether being low paid last year. In terms of econometric issues, they found that omitting the
initial state will lead to overstatement of the effects of explanatory variables.
Cappellari and Jenkins (2004) studied low income transitions with data from a British
panel survey, the results showed that there is substantial state dependence effect in poverty. They
also estimated low income transition rates and the lengths of poverty for different person.
Later, Stewart (2007) examined the extent of state dependence in unemployment and low
wage employment. He found that, previous experience of low wage employment and
unemployment have almost as large effect on future prospects. He suggested that obtaining a
high wage job will decrease the probability of repeated unemployment significantly.
Prowse (2012) studied the effect of previous employment outcomes on future
employment by distinguishing full time and part time employment, considering unobserved
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heterogeneity, children and education. The results showed variation in effect of children and
education. The author found that, comparing temporary part time employment and full time
employment, the part time employment has a higher state dependence effect in future
employment than full time employment.
State Dependence, R&D, and Innovation
The persistence of innovation refers to the influence of past innovation activities on
current and future innovation behavior and success. State dependence theory suits well into the
research on persistence of innovation and it has been studied since 1990s. Flaig and Stadler
(1994) studied the product and process innovations of private firms with a dynamic random
effects probit model. They found that, firms` probability of innovation depend on market
structure, unobserved heterogeneity, and realized innovations in the previous year. The positive
significant effect of past innovation on future innovation suggested there is strong state
dependence.
Cefis and Orsenigo (2001) examined the persistence of innovative activities with panel
data from six different countries in the period of 1978-1993. By applying a transition probability
matrix approach, they found evidence of persistence in innovative activities and they also found
that, the effect of persistence declined as time passes. They also suggested that, both innovators
and non-innovators have a high persistence to remain in their state.
Peters (2009) investigated firms` innovative behavior from 1994 to 2002 with a panel of
German manufacturing firms. He found that the persistence at the firm level is significant in both
manufacturing firms and service firms by applying a dynamic random effect model. Moreover,
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he found that among the factors of firms, the knowledge provided by skilled employees is the
most important factor in explaining the innovative behavior of the firms.
Ganter and Hecker (2013) studied persistence of technological and organizational types
of innovation with moderating effects of firm level characteristics and evaluated the sources of
state dependence. The results showed that, For organizational innovation, the model shows the
firm’s propensity to adopt technological innovations significantly increases with previous
adoption of technological innovation, firm size, and public support in financing innovations;
while organizational innovations does not show the same pattern. The authors suggested that, in
terms of technological innovation, there is a strong state dependence effect, past success of
innovation will have an impact on the adoption of new technological innovation, however,
organizational innovation does not show the same effect.
Triguero and Corcoles (2013) studied persistence of innovation with a panel of
manufacturing firms from Spain in the period of 1990-2008. They applied a dynamic random
effects probit model controlling for initial conditions and unobserved heterogeneity. The results
showed that both R&D and innovation have strong persistence at the firm level. Regarding
specific factors, firm size and outsourcing have positive effects on R&D and innovation.
Pere Arque-Castells (2013) measured the state dependence in R&D based on a panel of
Spanish manufacturing firms from 1998 to 2009. The results showed positive significant state
dependence effect. Moreover, they found that R&D subsidies can generate on average 9% of
inducement effects and this effect varies from small to large firms, they concluded that the
amount of subsidies needed to generate the same inducement effects for small firms are larger.
State Dependence and Marketing
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The state dependence effect has been studied by marketing scholars since 1990s.
Conventionally, marketing scholars tend to believe that brand choice behavior of the majority of
consumers were consistent with the zero-order process, meaning that there is no significant
causal relation between past purchase and current purchase (Bass 1974, 1984). In applying state
dependence theory, Michael Keane (1997) first studied the persistence in brand choice and found
a substantial state dependence effect using Nielsen data after controlling for heterogeneity. Also
he concluded that this effect tend to decline as time passes, suggesting that the long term effect
of promotion is positive but small.
Seetharaman, P. B., Andrew Ainslie, and Pradeep K. Chintagunta (1999) investigated the
household state dependence effect across different categories through a Bayesian variance
component approach. The results showed that household exhibited strong state dependence effect
in four of the five categories studied (one category does not show effect). The authors found that,
sensitivity to marketing mix and category expenditure variables are associated with greater state
dependence while household demographics such as family size or income did not have an
influence on state dependence.
Seetharaman, P. B (2004) proposed a new utility theoretic brand choice model with
different sources of state dependence effect incorporated: structural state dependence (effect of
previous brand choice), correlated error terms in random utility function (effect of habit type 1),
correlations between utility maximizing alternatives (effect of habit type 2) and carryover effects
(effect of previous marketing mix variables). By using scanner data, the author showed that
structural state dependence to be the most important effect among the four proposed effects.
Meanwhile, the author showed that lagged promotions have carryover effects on habit
persistence.
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Che, Hai, K. Sudhir, and P. B. Seetharaman (2007) investigated the pricing behavior of
manufacturers and retailers with a demand that is state dependent. They estimated the effect with
household level scanner data and found that, omission of state dependence in demand will lead to
biased inference of firm behavior and observed retail prices are consistent with a pricing model
where both manufacturers and retailers are forward looking, based on this, they suggested that
even a myopic pricing model with state dependence effect accounted in demand will be a
reasonable approximation.
Dubé, Jean‐Pierre, Günter J. Hitsch, and Peter E. Rossi (2010) studied the phenomenon
of consumer inertia with an explanation from state dependence theory. They found significant
structural state dependence using data from margarine and refrigerated orange juice purchase.
The authors suggested three economic explanations for the state dependence, preference change
due to the loyalty, search and learning induced by past purchase experience, the data used by the
authors supported the loyalty explanation.
Pavlidis, Polykarpos, and Paul B. Ellickson (2017) explored the importance of parent
brand state dependence effect on pricing outcomes of forward looking multi product firms.
Through numerical simulation, the authors found that loyalty to the parent brand lead to
decreased prices and reduced profits of the joint profit maximization relative to sub brand profit
maximization and state dependence effect to the sub-brand will mediate this.
State Dependence and Health
While the state dependence theory have been well applied in unemployment dynamics,
income dynamics, innovation dynamics and brand choice dynamics, the application in health is
less well established. With the first paper came out in 2000s. Contoyannis, Paul, Andrew M.
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Jones, and Nigel Rice (2004) studied health dynamics using British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS) data from 1991 to 1998. The authors applied both static and dynamic panel probit
models allowing for both state dependence effect and unobserved heterogeneity. The results of
dynamic panel probit models showed significant positive state dependence effect.
Halliday (2008) studied the persistence in the evolution of health over the life cycle and
two sources of persistence are allowed: unobserved heterogeneity and state dependence. The
author used data from PSID (Panel Study of Income Dynamics) and the main variables used are
self reported health status, age and gender. The results showed modest level of state dependence
in half the population and for the other half the state dependence is found to be near unity. The
author explained that this could be due to the large number of people who never exit healthy
states. Among the factors that influence an individual`s health, the authors concluded that the
early adulthood health and before have a far reaching effect.
Contoyannis, Paul, and Jinhu Li (2011) studied the health outcome persistence from
childhood to adolescence using data from Canadian National Longitudian Survey of Children
and Youth. The authors suggested that positive significant state dependence exist in health
dynamics of children and further ,the results showed that children living in poorer/lower
education level neighborhoods tend to experience poor health status for longer, and children tend
to experience health drops living in neighborhoods where more families headed by lone-parents
living in rental accommodations.
Roy and Schurer (2013) examined the persistence in mental health problems using a
panel data from Australia applying different approaches including GMM and correlated random
effects. Their results showed that, an individual who had a problem of depression before is five
times more likely to experience depression a year later, indicating a strong evidence of state
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dependence. Among the factors, low income is a significant factor for depression for both men
and women.
Carro and Traferri (2014) examined the persistence in self reported health status using a
dynamic ordered probit model with two fixed effects controlling for unobserved health status and
reporting behavior. The authors found strong state dependence effects in self reported health
status. A small but significant effect of income on health status is found among other
socioeconomic variables.
Hospital Value Based Purchasing (VBP) Program and Payment Adjustment
Established by Section 1886 of the Social Security Act, the HVBP program is the first
national pay for performance (P4P) program implemented and administrated by CMS (Center for
Medicare & Medicaid Services). The quality of care are evaluated in four domains: safety,
efficiency, clinical care and patient experience. Different measures are used to evaluate the
performance on the four domains (detailed measures of the four domains are in the appendix).
CMS assesses the hospital`s performance by comparing the hospital`s achievement points
(awarded by comparing a hospital`s rates during the performance period with all hospitals` rates
during the baseline period) and improvement points (awarded by comparing a hospital`s rates
during the performance period with the hospital`s self rates during the baseline period). The
greater of the two (achievement point and improvement point) is used to calculate the total
performance score (TPS). The weight of the four domains are adjusted from year to year.
For example, the total performance score for FY 2015 is calculated as:
𝑇𝑃𝑆2015 = 0.20 ∗ 𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 + 0.30 ∗ 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 + 0.20
∗ 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 + 0.30 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒
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And the total performance score for FY 2016 is calculated as:
𝑇𝑃𝑆2016 = 0.10 ∗ 𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 + 0.25 ∗ 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 + 0.25
∗ 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 + 0.40 𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒
The program will first reduce a portion of the hospital`s Medicare payments and then
distribute this portion of money to the hospitals based on the quality of care provided to patients.
For FY 2013, the portion is 1 percent of total Medicare payments and the percent will increase
0.25 each subsequent year. For FY 2017 and later, the portion is set at 2 percent. In terms of total
amount of money distributed by the program, for FY 2013, it is $963 million and for FY 2017, it
is $ 1.8 billion.
METHODOLOGY
To model this type of state dependence effect, we apply the following model:
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡′ 𝛽 + 𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑗−1 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡
where 𝒚𝒊𝒕 is the binary outcome of whether a hospital receive a reward (equals 1) or a
panelty (equals 0),𝒚𝒊𝒕−𝟏 is whether the hospital receive a reward or panelty last year (lag of
dependent variable), 𝒙𝒊𝒕 is the vector of observed hospital characteristics, 𝛂𝒊 captures the
unobserved heterogeneity and 𝒖𝒊𝒕 is the error term. The null is there is no state dependence (𝛾
=0). The estimate of parameter 𝛾 is the average state dependence over time and is our
focus.,Several assumptions are contained in the equation. First, the dynamics are first order, i.e.
𝑦𝑖𝑗−2 does not have an effect on 𝑦𝑖𝑗 ; Second, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 are appropriately strictly exogenous, conditional
on unobserved heterogeneity. The assumptions are the same as Wooldridge (2005).
Given the two assumptions (dynamics are first order; 𝑥𝑖𝑡 are strict exogenous), let
ft (yt |xt , yt−1 , α; β) be the corretly specified density, then the density of (𝑦𝑖1 , … , 𝑦𝑖𝑇 ) is
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𝑁

𝑇

∏ ∏ 𝑓𝑡 (𝑦𝑖𝑡 |𝑥𝑖𝑡 , 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 , 𝛼𝑖 ; 𝛽0 )
𝑖=1 𝑡=1

To get an estimate of parameter β, we need to face the fact that it depends on
unobservables, αi . To solve this, we can treat 𝛼𝑖 as parameters to be estimated, this leads to the
maximization of the log likelihood function
𝑁

𝑇

∑ ∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑓𝑡 (𝑦𝑖𝑡 |𝑥𝑖𝑡 , 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 , 𝛼𝑖 ; 𝛽)
𝑖=1 𝑡=1

As is pointed out by Hsiao (1986), the initial conditions will not be a problem if T is
large, unfortunately in our dataset comparing with i, T is small. So we need to endogenize and
model the initial condition to obtain consistent estimate. In previous research, three ways have
been proposed to solve the problem of handling the initial conditions in dynamic nonlinear
models, as is summarized by Hsiao (1986, section 7.4), the first one is to treat the initial
conditions for each unit as nonrandom, however this requires very strong assumptions that the
initial condition 𝒚𝒊𝟎 is independent of unobserved heterogeneity.
The second approach, proposed by Hsiao (1986, section 4.3) is to use the joint
distribution of outcomes on the response condition on unobserved heterogeneity and observed
variables and allow the initial condition to be random. The main difficulty in this approach is to
specifying the distribution of initial condition based on unobserved heterogeneity. The last one is
to approximate the conditional distribution of the initial condition, as is proposed by Heckman
(1981) but it is more difficult computationally to obtain estimate of parameters and average
effects.
Here we apply the Wooldridge (2005) approach to handle this problem, which is to
model the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity conditional on observed exogenous variables
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and initial values (use the density of (𝑦𝑖1 , … , 𝑦𝑖𝑇 ) conditional on (𝑦𝑖0 , 𝑥𝑖 ) , i.e., specifying
𝑓(𝛼|𝑦𝑖0 , 𝑥𝑖 )). Under this approach, assume ℎ(𝑐|𝑦0 , 𝑧; 𝛿) is a correctly specified model for the
density of 𝐷(𝑐𝑖 |𝑦𝑖0 , 𝑧𝑖 ), the density of (𝑦𝑖1 , … , 𝑦𝑖𝑇 ) given (𝑦𝑖0 = 𝑦0 , 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥 ) is:
T

∫ (∏ ft (yt |xt , yt−1 , α; β0 )) h(α| y0 , x; δ0 )η(dα)
RJ

t=1

Which leads to the log-likelihood function conditional on (𝒚𝒊𝟎 , 𝒙𝒊 ) to be:
T

li (β, δ) = log [∫ (∏ ft (yt |xt , yt−1 , α; β)) h(α| yi0 , xi ; δ)η(dα)]
RJ

t=1

After this we sum up the log-likelihood function with respect to i = 1, . . ., N and
maximize with respect to β, δ, we get estimate of β0 , δ0 . The result conditional MLE is √N
consistent and asymptotic normal under standard regularity conditions.
To obtain the estimate of partial effect, let q(yt ) be a scalar function of yt , then the
average partial effects across the distribution of αi is:
μ(xt , yt−1 ) = E[m(xt , yt−1 , αi ; β0 )]
where
m(xt , yt−1 , αi ; β0 ) = E[q(yit )|xit = xt , yi,t−1 = yt−1 , αi = α]
= ∫ q(yt )ft (yt |xt , yt−1 , α; β0 )v(dyt )
RG

A consistent estimator can be obtained by
N

μ̂(xt , yt−1 ) = N −1 ∑

r(xt , yt−1 , xi , yi0 ; β̂, δ̂)

i=1
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Where r(xt , yt−1 , xi , yi0 ; β0, δ0 ) = E[m(xt , yt−1 , αi ; β0 )|yi0 , xi ]]
The entry probability is 𝑒𝑖𝑡 ≡ P r(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 = 0, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝛷[(𝑥𝑖𝑡′ 𝛽)(1 − 𝜌)0.5 ]
The persistence probability is
𝑠𝑖𝑡 ≡ P r(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 = 1, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝛷[(𝛾 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡′ 𝛽)(1 − 𝜌)0.5 ]
Where Φ[ ] is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and ρ is the fraction
of variance that attributes to the variation in the time-invariant individual effects.
By comparing the raw persistence and predicted persistence, we can derive the
percentage of the raw persistence explained by the state dependence effect is
P r(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 = 1, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 ) − P r(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 = 0, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 )⁄P r(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 = 1) − P r(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 = 0)
DATA
The data are obtained from three main sources: characteristics of hospitals (for example
number of employees, number of beds, number of discharge) are obtained from CMS Impact File
and payment adjustment data come from Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS),
demographics data within 10 miles radius come from the Census Bureau.
Number of hospitals participating in the program, average adjustment factor, number of
hospitals received award/penalty are shown in the Table 3.1:
[Table 3.1 about here]
Total number of hospitals vary from year to year because CMS has established a
minimum data requirement for number of cases, measures, surveys, etc. For example, for the
patient experience domain, hospital must report at least 100 patient surveys in order to receive a
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score for this domain. Inclusion of data that do not meet the requirement could skew the results
and further impact the calculation of total performance score.
CMS do not publish the exact amount of money that are awarded or penalized for each
hospital, only in FY 2016, they published the distribution in Table 3.2 and 3.3:
[Table 3.2 about here]
[Table 3.3 about here]
Here I construct a balanced panel with 2471 hospitals from year 2013 to 2018, total
14826 observations. As is mentioned in the theory part of state dependence, there are two
reasons that the realization of an event affects the probability that the same event occurring again
in the future. The first one is that, the experience has a genuine behavioral effect that will lead
the hospital to behave differently as opposed to the same hospital who has not experienced that
event (i.e. true state dependence). The second one is individuals may differ in unobserved factors
(unobserved heterogeneity or spurious state dependence).
Since I have the data of whether the hospitals get reward through the six years (2013 to
2018), I can calculate the conditional probabilities of a hospital that receive a reward this year,
conditional on last year`s reward status. If there is no difference on the two conditional
probabilities, then there is model free evidence that last year`s reward status has no effect on this
year`s status. Table 3.4 shows the conditional probabilities:
[Table 3.4 about here]
Comparing Column 3 and 4 of the Table 3.4, I can see that, if in the previous year, a
hospital got rewarded, then next year, its probability of receiving a reward again is about twice of
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the hospital who got a penalty last year. So I can see that there is a considerable state dependence
in hospitals` payment adjustment by HVBP program.
In Table 3.5 I summarize the dependent variable and explanatory variables used in this
study, with their mean value and standard error.
[Table 3.5 about here]
RESULTS
In Table 3.6 I show results of estimates based on simple pooled probit estimator, random
effects probit estimator and the Wooldridge estimator. The hospitals in the category of
rural/proprietary/lowest CMI/none teaching/lowest bed capacity of New England are used as the
benchmarking ones.
[Table 3.6 about here]
The lag of dependent variable (reward t-1) is positive significant across the three
estimators, suggesting there is a positive significant state dependence.
The preferred model (Wooldridge model) gives an average marginal effect of 0.341,
which means that hospitals that received a reward in previous year are 34.1% more probably to
receive a reward this year than the ones that received a penalty in previous year. This explains
77.1% of the persistence observed in the data.
For other explanatory variables, some hospital characteristics are significantly associated
with the likelihood of receiving a reward from CMS, for example, number of employees show a
significant positive effect, number of beds show a significant negative effect, teaching status
show a significant negative effect, percent of Medicare/Medicaid discharge show a moderate
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negative effect. Comparing with proprietary hospitals, voluntary nonprofit and government
owned hospitals are more likely to receive a reward.
Among demographic variables, I observe a moderate significant negative effect from
number of black and Hispanic population, household income shows a significant positive effect
on the probability of a hospital receive a reward, and competition show a moderate significant
positive effect.
For geographic factors, I do observe that, comparing with hospitals located in rural area,
hospitals located in urban areas are less likely to receive a reward, comparing with hospitals
located in New England area, the hospitals located in Mid Atlantic, West South Central show a
significant less likelihood of receiving a reward, the hospitals located in East South Central show
a moderate significant less likelihood of receiving a reward, while hospitals located in other
areas do not show a significant difference.
Above are the estimates from the three estimators based on the whole sample. I
controlled for the hospital ownership and located areas with a set of dummy variables. However,
this state dependence effect may differ over the different ownership and geographic areas. So I
analyzed the interaction terms between lag of reward status and dummy variables of hospital
ownership and geo location. A test of equality of coefficients is performed to examine if the state
dependence effect across different ownership/geographic areas are the same or not. If the state
dependence effect is different across those, then there is evidence to suggest the policy design
across different kind of ownership and different geographic areas should be different. By
performing the Wald test, I obtained the results in Table 3.7:
[Table 3.7 about here]
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The test of equality of coefficient shows a chi-2 value of 8.98 and a p value of 0.011,
which means that the state dependence effect are significantly different between large
urban/other urban/rural hospitals.
I further performed pair wise comparison test to see if the effect is equal between pairs of
large urban/other urban, large urban/rural, other urban/rural hospitals, the results of the chi-2 and
p value can be found in the last two rows of Table 3.8, I can see that among the three pairs, the
state dependence effect differ significantly between hospitals located in large urban areas and
other urban areas, for other pairs, it is not significantly different.
[Table 3.8 about here]
The test of equality of coefficient shows a chi-2 value of 7.34 and a p value of 0.026,
which means that the state dependence effect are significantly different across hospitals of
different ownership. For pair wise comparison, I found that, the state dependence effect is
significantly different between voluntary nonprofit hospitals and proprietary hospitals, also, for
voluntary nonprofit hospitals and government owned hospitals, it is also significantly different,
for other pair wise comparison, I don`t found a significant difference.
Analysis of Hospitals that are Penalized or Rewarded every year
In this section, I considered only the hospitals that were penalized or rewarded every year
from 2013 to 2018 and built a model to find out if there is a relationship between the hospital
characteristics and the amount of penalty or reward.
For the hospitals that were penalized every year from 2013 to 2018, there are 280
hospitals (out of the total number 2471). I estimate the following model:
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𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡′ 𝛿 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡
where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the extent of penalty paid by the hospital i in year t (between 0 and 1, larger
𝑃𝑖𝑡 equals more penalty paid), 𝑥𝑖𝑡′ is the same hospital characteristics I used in previous section,
𝜆𝑖 is the hospital specific random effect and 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is the individual specific random effect.
Also, I considered the hospitals that received a reward from the program every year from
2013 to 2018, there are 345 hospitals in total. Again, I estimated the same model as above with
the extent of reward received as the dependent variable. The results of the two model estimates
are in the following table:
[Table 3.9 about here]
From the results I can see that, among the hospitals that were penalized every year,
number of employees, number of discharges and competition play a key role: number of
employees shows a negative significant effect, meaning that, for the hospitals that received a
penalty each year, the larger the number of employees, the smaller the amount of penalty;
number of discharges has a positive significant effect, meaning that, for the hospitals that
received a penalty each year, the smaller the number of discharges, the smaller the amount of
penalty; competition (measured by the number of people per hospital in the 10 miles radius) has
a negative significant effect, meaning that, the smaller the competition, the smaller the penalty.
Other factors do not show a significant effect.
Among the hospitals that were rewarded every year, the factors that have a significant
effect are: number of employees, number of discharges, number of white people, number of
household income, bed capacity, case mix index and geo-regions. For number of employees I
found a positive significant effect, meaning that for hospitals that received a reward each year,
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the larger the number of employees, the larger the amount of reward; for number of discharges I
found a negative significant effect, meaning that for hospitals that received a reward each year,
the smaller the number of discharges, the larger the amount of reward; For socio economic
factors, I found that the larger the number of white people, the smaller the amount of reward, the
larger the number of household income, the larger the amount of reward; For patient
characteristics, I found the more the clinical complexity, the larger the amount of reward; For
geo-region factors, I found that comparing with hospitals located in rural area, the hospitals
located in urban areas received a smaller amount of reward; comparing with hospitals in New
England area, hospitals located in Mid Atlantic and East South Central received a smaller
amount of reward.
CONCLUSION
Hospital Value Based Purchasing (HVBP) program, launched and administrated by CMS
(center for Medicare and Medicaid Services), is the first national level p4p program for hospitals
in US. Although some research suggests moderate to none improvement in hospital quality, how
the payment adjustment decision is made, whether the payment adjustment has a long last effect
(other than just immediate effect) on hospital has not been studied. In this research, I applied a
dynamic probit random effects model to analyze the state dependence effect in hospital payment
adjustment. I ask the question that, does hospitals` payment adjustment status depends on last
year`s status, and what are the factors that influence the hospitals` likelihood of receiving a
reward in this program. The results showed a positive significant state dependence effect across
the three different models I estimated and is significant with hospitals located in different geo
areas (large urban/other urban/rural) and with hospitals of different ownerships (government
owned/voluntary non profit/proprietary).
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For the factors that impact the likelihood that a hospital receive a reward from the HVBP
program, I found that number of employees show a significant positive effect, suggesting that as
the number of employees get larger, hospitals have more labor resources, and can manage to
improve upon the quality measures to reach a reward; number of beds and discharges show a
significant negative effect, suggesting that as patient volumn get heavier, hospitals become
unable to meet the quality criteria, suggesting there is a potentially a negative network effect.
Teaching status show a significant negative effect, this makes sense because residents in
hospitals are still in their training stage and may not be able to perform in a quality level that is
required by the program. Percent of Medicare/Medicaid discharge show a moderate negative
effect. Comparing with proprietary hospitals, voluntary non profit and government owned
hospitals are more likely to receive a reward.
Among demographic variables, I observe a moderate significant negative effect from
number of black and Hispanic population, household income show a significant positive effect
on the probability of a hospital receive a reward, and competition show a moderate significant
positive effect.
For geographic factors, I do observe that, comparing with hospitals located in rural area,
hospitals located in urban areas are less likely to receive a reward, comparing with hospitals
located in New England area, the hospitals located in Mid Atlantic, West South Central show a
significant less likelihood of receiving a reward, the hospitals located in East South Central show
a moderate significant less likelihood of receiving a reward, while hospitals located in other
areas do not show a significant difference.
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FIGURES AND TABLES FOR CHAPTER THREE
Table 3.1: Number of Hospitals Awarded and Penalized
Year

No of Hospital
Penalized

No of Hospital
Awarded

Total
Number
of
Hospital

Min
Max Adjustment
Adjustment Factor
Factor

2013

1426

1557

2984

0.991

1.008

2014

1473

1255

2728

0.989

1.007

2015

1375

1714

3089

0.987

1.021

2016

1235

1806

3041

0.983

1.024

2017

1343

1612

2955

0.982

1.032

2018

1211

1597

2808

0.983

1.030
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Table 3.2: Distribution of Change of Payments for FY 2016
Change of Payment

Number of Hospitals

>$150,000

284

$120,001 to $150,000

103

$90,001 to $120,000

172

$60,001 to $90,000

217

$30,001 to $60,000

366

$1 to $30,000

652

$0 to $0

0

$-30,000 to $-1

391

$-60,000 to $-30,001

182

$-90,000 to $-60,001

138

$-120,000 to $-90,001

98

$-150,000 to $-120,001

73

<=-$150,000

349

Table 3.3: Distribution of Percentage Change of Payments for FY 2016
Change of Percentage of Payment

Number of Hospitals

1.0% < x

316

0.9% < x ≤ 1.0%

77

0.8% < x ≤ 0.9%

92

0.7% < x ≤ 0.8%

94

0.6% < x ≤ 0.7%

108

0.5% < x ≤ 0.6%

123

0.4% < x ≤ 0.5%

174

0.3% < x ≤ 0.4%

194

66

0.2% < x ≤ 0.3%

194

0.1% < x ≤ 0.2%

212

0.0% < x ≤ 0.1%

210

0.00%

0

-0.1% < x ≤ 0.0%

222

-0.2% < x ≤ -0.1%

227

-0.3% < x ≤ -0.2%

197

-0.4% < x ≤ -0.3%

162

-0.5% < x ≤ -0.4%

133

-0.6% < x ≤ -0.5%

85

-0.7% < x ≤ -0.6%

105

-0.8% < x ≤ -0.7%

42

-0.9% < x ≤ -0.8%

37

-1.0% < x ≤ -0.9%

13

x ≤ -1.0%
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Table 3.4: Conditional and Unconditional Probabilities that a Hospital Receive a Reward
Year

Unconditional
(𝑷𝒊𝒕 = 𝟏)

Awarded at t-1

Penalized at t-1

(𝑷𝒊𝒕 = 𝟏|𝑷𝒊𝒕−𝟏 = 𝟏)

(𝑷𝒊𝒕 = 𝟏|𝑷𝒊𝒕−𝟏 = 𝟎)

2014

0.467

0.677

0.246

2015

0.516

0.675

0.377

2016

0.553

0.786

0.285

2017

0.511

0.717

0.257

2018

0.548

0.815

0.268

Table 3.5: Summary of Dependent and Explanatory Variables
Variable Name
Dependent Variable

Description

Mean

SD
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Reward Status

Whether a hospital was
rewarded (binary variable)

Explanatory Variable
Geographic
Characteristics
New England CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT
Mid Atlantic
NJ, NY, PA
East North Central IL, IN, MI, OH, WI
West North Cenral IA, KS, MN, MO, NE,
ND, SD
South Atlantic DE, FL, GA, MD, NC,
SC, VA, DC, WV
East South Central AL, KY, MS, TN
West South Central AR, LA, OK, TX
Mountain AZ, CO, ID, MT, NV,
NM, UT, WY
Pacific AL, CA, HI, OR, WA
Large Urban Area Hospital located in a large
urban area
Other Urban Area Hospital located in other
(small) urban area
Rural Area Hospital located in a rural
area
Demographic
Characteristics
White Population Number of white residents
in the zip code (in
thousands)
Black Population Number of black residents
in the zip code (in
thousands)
Hispanic Population Number of Hispanic
residents in the zip code
(in thousands)
Household Income Average Household
income in the zip code (in
thousands)
Competition Number of people per
hospital in 10-mile radius
of a hospital (in
thousands)
Hospital Characteristics
Ownership
Government Owned Hospitals owned by
government

0.518

0.048
0.129
0.174
0.082
0.178
0.084
0.120
0.065
0.140
0.418
0.339
0.243

18.21

10.81

3.21

4.64

4.16

7.43

45.70

19.77

5.23

7.11

0.154
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Voluntary non-profit

Proprietary
Bed Capacity
Small
Medium
Large
Teaching Status
None
Very Minor

Minor

Major

Very Major
Case Mix Index

Quartile 1
Quartile 2
Quartile 3
Quartile 4
Number of Employees
Number of Discharges

Percent of
Medicare/Medicaid
Discharge

(district/local/state/federal)
Voluntary non profit
hospitals owned by
churches or other private
entities
Proprietary hospitals
Number of beds in a
hospital
Hospitals with<100 beds
Hospitals with 100 to 399
beds
Hospitals with ≥400 beds
resident-to-bed ratio in a
hospital
Hospitals with no
residents
Hospitals with resident-tobed ratio between 0.001
and 0.049
Hospitals with resident-tobed ratio between 0.050
and 0.249
Hospitals with resident-tobed ratio between 0.250
and 0.599
Hospitals with resident-tobed ratio≥0.600
diversity, clinical
complexity, and the need
for resources in a
hospital
Hospitals with CMI≤1.254
Hospitals with CMI
between 1.255 and 1.446
Hospitals with CMI
between 1.447 and 1.645
Hospitals with CMI≥1.646
Number of total paid
employees in a hospital
Total number of
discharges in a year for a
hospital
The ratio of
Medicare/Medicaid
discharge over total

0.655

0.191
226.34

191.41

0.251
0.611
0.138
0.072

0.166

0.636
0.109

0.155

0.07

0.03
1.539

0.266

0.131
0.255
0.298
0.316
1460.53

1861.51

10986.35

10541.99

0.470

0.132
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number of discharge

Table 3.6: Results of Model Estimates of State Dependency
reward t-1
reward 0
No of Employees t-1
No of Discharges t-1
Percent of
Medicare/Medicaid
Discharge t-1
Bed Capacity Medium
t-1
Bed Capacity Large t1
CMI Q2 t-1
CMI Q3 t-1
CMI Q4 t-1
Government Owned
Voluntary non-profit
Very Minor Teaching
t-1
Minor Teaching t-1
Major Teaching t-1
Very Major Teaching
t-1
White Population
Black Population
Hispanic Population
Household Income
Competition
reward t-1*LURBAN
reward t-1*OURBAN
reward t1*Government Owned
reward t-1*Voluntary
Non Profit
Large Urban Area
Other Urban Area
Mid Atlantic
East North Central
West North Cenral
South Atlantic

Pooled Probit
1.087 (0.025)***

RE Probit
0.973 (0.033)***

0.073 (0.039)***
-0.008 (0.003)*
0.019 (0.118)

0.079 (0.017)***
-0.009 (0.004)*
-0.038 (0.135)*

Wooldridge
0.867 (0.035)***
0.248 (0.035)***
0.085 (0.018)***
-0.009 (0.004)*
0.074 (0.140)*

-0.296 (0.039)***

-0.331 (0.045)***

-0.329 (0.047)***

-0.421 (0.071)***

-0.464 (0.082)***

-0.467 (0.086)***

0.034 (0.045)
0.021 (0.049)
0.009 (0.055)
0.072 (0.043)
0.209 (0.034)***
-0.121 (0.043)**

0.051 (0.050)
0.044 (0.056)
0.034 (0.062)
0.075 (0.051)
0.226 (0.040)***
-0.139 (0.049)**

0.042 (0.052)
0.033 (0.058)
0.024 (0.064)
0.104 (0.054)*
0.260 (0.042)***
-0.143 (0.052)**

-0.134 (0.039)**
-0.171 (0.059)**
-0.162 (0.088)

-0.154 (0.045)**
-0.195 (0.068)**
-0.190 (0.101)

-0.145 (0.047)**
-0.204 (0.070)**
-0.173 (0.106)

0.001 (0.001)
-0.008 (0.003)*
-0.005 (0.002)*
0.004 (0.001)***
0.003 (0.001)*
-0.033 (0.063)
0.138 (0.066)
-0.085 (0.070)

0.002 (0.002)
-0.009 (0.003)*
-0.006 (0.003)*
0.005 (0.001)***
0.003 (0.001)*
-0.056 (0.067)
0.131 (0.070)
-0.106 (0.074)

0.002 (0.002)
-0.009 (0.004)*
-0.006 (0.003)*
0.005 (0.001)***
0.003 (0.001)*
-0.057 (0.068)
0.126 (0.072)
-0.113 (0.076)

-0.164 (0.063)**

-0.178 (0.067)**

-0.172 (0.068)**

-0.150 (0.044)***
-0.158 (0.039)***
-0.281 (0.068)***
-0.023 (0.067)
0.016 (0.074)
-0.025 (0.068)

-0.163 (0.051)***
-0.173 (0.046)***
-0.310 (0.079)***
-0.015 (0.078)
0.024 (0.086)
-0.016 (0.078)

-0.175 (0.054)***
-0.190 (0.048)***
-0.314 (0.084)***
-0.038 (0.083)
0.017 (0.091)
-0.037 (0.083)
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East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific
Average Partial Effect

-0.183 (0.075)*
-0.192 (0.088)*
-0.194 (0.072)**
-0.208 (0.083)**
-0.149 (0.079)
-0.172 (0.092)
-0.071 (0.072)
-0.087 (0.084)
0.427
0.381
(***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1)

-0.210 (0.092)*
-0.234 (0.088)**
-0.184 (0.096)
-0.067 (0.088)
0.341

Table 3.7: Comparison of State Dependence Effect across Different Geo-area
Large Urban Hospitals
reward t-1
number of hospitals
number of
observations
estimated state
dependence effect
test of equality of
coefficient
chi-2
p value
pair wise
comparison
chi-2
p value

0.749 (0.053)***
1033
6198

Other Urban
Hospitals
0.962 (0.061)***
838
5028

0.935 (0.069)***
600
3600

0.297

0.375

0.365

LURBAN/OURBAN

8.98
0.011
OURBAN/RURAL

RURAL/LURBAN

8.84
3.47
0.003***
0.06
(***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1)

Rural Hospitals

0.70
0.40

Table 3.8: Comparison of State Dependence Effect across Different Ownership

reward t-1
number of hospitals
number of
observations
estimated state
dependence effect
test of equality of
coefficient
chi-2
p value
pair wise
comparison
chi-2

Government Owned
Hospitals
0.648 (0.091)***
380
2280

Voluntary non profit
Hospitals
0.953 (0.043)***
1618
9708

Proprietary
Hospitals
0.752 (0.076)***
473
2838

0.265

0.371

0.293

G/V

7.34
0.026
V/P

P/G

8.42

6.39

2.23
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p value

0.001***
0.01*
(***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1)

0.14

Table 3.9: Results of Model Estimates of Extent of Penalty/Reward
No of Employees t-1
No of Discharges t-1
Percent of
Medicare/Medicaid
Discharge t-1
Bed Capacity Medium
t-1
Bed Capacity Large t-1
CMI Q2 t-1
CMI Q3 t-1
CMI Q4 t-1
Government Owned
Voluntary non-profit
Very Minor Teaching t1
Minor Teaching t-1
Major Teaching t-1
Very Major Teaching t1
White Population
Black Population
Hispanic Population
Household Income
Competition
Large Urban Area
Other Urban Area
Mid Atlantic
East North Central
West North Cenral
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific

Extent of Reward
0.04 (0.03)*
-0.01 (0.005)***
-0.4 (0.1)*

Extent of Penalty
-0.02 (0.01)**
0.007 (0.002)***
-0.02 (0.08)

-0.1 (0.03)***

0.04 (0.04)

-0.0009 (0.09)
0.1 (0.03)***
0.2 (0.04)***
0.2 (0.04)***
-0.06 (0.04)
-0.01 (0.04)
-0.01 (0.04)

0.07 (0.05)
0.008 (0.04)
0.03 (0.04)
0.08 (0.05)
0.05 (0.03)
0.02 (0.02)
-0.008 (0.02)

0.06 (0.04)
-0.05 (0.06)
0.04 (0.1)

-0.004 (0.02)
-0.02(0.03)
-0.01 (0.04)

-0.003 (0.001)***
-0.0002 (0.001)
0.004 (0.005)
0.001 (0.001)
-0.0002 (0.003)
0.001 (0.001)
0.002 (0.0008)***
-0.0007(0.0005)
0.0001(0.001)
-0.002 (0.0008)***
-0.2 (0.04)***
-0.01 (0.03)
-0.1(0.03)***
-0.009 (0.03)
-0.1 (0.07)*
0.06(0.04)
-0.04 (0.06)
0.02 (0.03)
0.01 (0.06)
-0.04 (0.05)
-0.07 (0.06)
0.02 (0.05)
-0.1 (0.07)*
0.04 (0.05)
-0.1 (0.06)**
-0.02 (0.05)
-0.1(0.07)
-0.04 (0.05)
-0.02 (0.07)
-0.01 (0.05)
(***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1)
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CHAPTER FOUR:
EFFECT OF DEREGULATION ON DRUG MARKET
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INTRODUCTION
Pharmaceutical industry impacts the health of a population and economics of a nation
significantly. U.S. pharmaceutical spending grows by 2.5% in 2019, reaching $370 billion. Fitch
Solutions (2019) estimates that by 2023, pharmaceutical spending will reach $420 billion,
account for nearly 1.7% of the national GDP. This growth in pharmaceutical spending has
exceeded GDP growth in United States as well as many other countries (Schumock 2019). Due
to the prominence of the pharmaceutical industry, it is highly regulated and deeply impacted by
public policies from approval of new drugs, drug pricing to drug distribution, among others.
In terms of drug price regulation, two mechanisms are commonly used: reference pricing
and price cap. According to a report by WHO (2015), 24 of 30 OECD countries and 20 of 27
European Union countries use the reference price regulation to control drug price. UK and China
adopted the price cap regulation system. But since pharmaceutical spending continues to grow
despite of price regulation, recently there are many callings to de-regulate. Since June 1st, 2015,
Chinese government decided to remove price cap regulation in pharmaceutical market and offers
us an opportunity to study the effect of de-regulation.
In this research, we applied an Interrupted Time Series Analysis (ITSA) approach to
study the effect of de-regulation of price cap in China`s pharmaceutical market. Data is obtained
from Sinopharm Group, the largest distributor in China`s pharmaceutical market. A total of nine
categories of drugs were analyzed and the results showed a clear pattern between industry HHI
and revenue change of the drugs.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We started with a literature review on
branded drugs/generic drugs competition, reference price regulation, price cap regulation and
their effects. After this, we described the China`s pharmaceutical market, our data and
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methodology. Then we presented the analysis and the results for the nine categories of drugs
after price cap deregulation. Lastly we conclude with discussions, implications of the price cap
deregulation in terms of government price regulation as well as the drug company pricing
practice.
BACKGROUND
Competition between Branded Drugs and Generic Drugs
Generic drugs are copies of branded drugs that have the same dosage, intended use,
effects, side effects, risks, safety, and strength. In other words, their pharmacological effects are
the same as those of their branded counterparts. Branded drugs come with patent protection, or
so called “exclusivity period”, which protects the branded drugs from the competition of generic
drugs. The length of exclusivity period varies from 3 years to 7 years, according to U.S. Food &
Drug Administration (2018), depends on the level of innovation of the branded drugs. After the
exclusivity period, the production of generic drugs is allowed thus bring competition to branded
drugs.
This competition from generic drugs to branded drugs arouse many attentions from
academia and industry. Aronsson (2001) analyzed how market shares for brand name drugs are
affected by generic competition. They used data for twelve different branded drugs, which are all
subject to generic competition. For five of these drugs, they find that the price of the branded
drugs relative to the average price of the generic ones significantly affects the market share of the
branded drug. Lexchin (2004) studied whether brand-name manufacturers compete on price once
generic competitors become available in the market. He identified 81 brand-name drugs that
lacked generic competition in July 1990 but had acquired generic competitors by December
1998. He compared and analyzed the price changes, the results showed no statistically significant
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change in brand-name prices when generic competition started. Gonzalez (2008) studied how
physician characteristics and prescribing decisions impact competition among branded drugs of a
therapeutic class once generic drugs enter the market. They found that generic entry in the
analyzed category would not only lead to the decrease in the prescription of the branded drugs
bioequivalent to the generics, but also lead to increase of non-bioequivalent branded drugs as
detailing-sensitive physicians switched from the contested drugs to these other branded
alternatives. Vandoros (2014) studied whether there is a switch in total (branded and generic)
consumption after generic entry from molecules that face generic competition towards other
molecules of the same class, which are still in-patent. Data from six European countries for the
time period 1991 to 2006 are used to study the cases of angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitors
and proton pump inhibitors. Empirical evidence shows that patent expiry led to a switch in total
(branded and generic) consumption towards other in-patent angiotensin-converting enzyme
inhibitors, whereas patent expiry of omeprazole led to a switch in consumption towards other
proton pump inhibitors.
Regulation on Drug Prices and the Effect
Pharmaceutical markets are regulated heavily. Most countries regulate manufacturer
prices for pharmaceuticals either through price cap regulation or reference price regulation. As is
stated by Danzon (2006), the rationale for drug price regulation derives from pervasive insurance
or third party payment, which makes patients insensitive to prices, hence creating incentives for
suppliers to charge higher prices than would occur without insurance. To counteract this supplier
moral hazard that applies to all insured health services, including drugs, both private and public
insurers limit the prices that they will pay for all insured health services.
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Price cap regulation refers to the practice that under which, the regulatory body sets a
maximum price that can be charged for a drug. The price cap may be based on cost plus a profit
margin, prices for the same product in other countries, or prices for therapeutic alternatives.
Previous research on the effect of price cap regulation has focused on the price of the drugs, sales
of drugs and how this regulation undermines or increase competition. Dalen (2006) used
monthly data over the period 1998–2004 for the six drugs in Norwegian pharmaceutical market
that were included in the price cap regulation, a structural model was estimated to examine the
impact of the regulation on both demand and market power. The results suggested that under the
price cap regulation, the market shares of generic drugs were increased, price competition
between generic and branded drugs were increased. Stremersch (2009) used 84 months of sales
data of newly introduced medicine and found that, manufacturer price controls, has a positive
effect on drug sales. The effect of manufacturer price controls is similar for newly launched and
mature drugs. Brekke (2015) used a dataset of monthly sales and price data of 165 on-patent
substances. Their findings suggested that, stricter price cap regulation reduces competition from
parallel imports, and has no (strictly negative) effect on producer profits in the presence
(absence) of parallel imports.
Reference price regulation refers to the practice that under which, the reference price is
the maximum reimbursement for a group of drugs. According to a report by WHO (2015), 24 of
30 OECD countries and approximately 20 of 27 European Union countries use the reference
price regulation to control drug price. This regulation regime also arouses many attentions.
Ekelund (2003) used a data set consisting of all new chemical entities (NCEs) launched in
Sweden between 1987 and 1997, the ratio of launch price to the average price of existing
branded substitutes and the same ratio four years later are used as the dependent variable. Their
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results showed that, reference pricing regulation leads to higher launch price and faster decline of
real price. Moreno-Torres (2009) studied the effect of reference pricing on number of entries of
generic firms in Spanish pharmaceutical market. He used dummies for reference pricing, number
of generic firms in the market, number of branded competitors in the market, revenues and age of
product as explanatory variables. The results showed the system of reference pricing restrains
generic entry. Brekke (2011) studied the effect of reference pricing using off-patent prescription
drugs within the 40 largest therapeutic groups from 1st of January 2001 to 31st of December
2004. The results showed that reference pricing significantly reduces both brand-name and
generic prices, and results in significantly lower brand-name market shares. Kaiser (2014)
studied the effects of reference pricing using a dataset from 2003 to 2007 in Denmark where the
reference price became effective in 2005. They found that the reference pricing led to substantial
reductions in drug prices as well as decreases in overall producer revenues and health care
expenditures.
Chinese Pharmaceutical Market and Regulation Practice
Chinese pharmaceutical market is the second largest (following United States as the
largest one) in the world, with over 122 billion value in USD by the year 2017 and it projected to
reach 180 billion value in USD by the year 2020. From 2010 to 2015 the compound annual
growth rate is about 15.5 percent and from 2016 to 2020, the compound annual growth rate is
about 8 percent (IMS Institute 2015). Although in recent years the growth slows down but it
continues to be above the growth of GDP.
Historically, government healthcare payments are lower than personal payments. Since
the public insurance plan named New Co-operative Medical Scheme (NCMS) was launched in
2003, the government payments has been growing and it exceeded private payments. In 2015,
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the total government healthcare expenditure reached 1422.5 billion in RMB (about 330.3 billion
in USD), that equals about 330.3 USD per capita and 4.98% of total GDP according to World
Health Organization (WHO 2016). Although the government expenditure on healthcare is
projected to grow but comparing to OECD countries, the number is still low. The NCMS plan
now covers about 96 percent of people in 2019 according to the latest news release by the
National Health Commission of China.
Generic drugs are the mainstay of Chinese pharmaceutical industry, according to a report
by Deloitte (Deloitte 2015), in 2015, the sales of generic drugs reached about 614 billion in RMB
(about 88 billion in USD), representing about 85% of the total pharmaceutical sales. The
compound annual growth rate of sales of generic drugs is projected around 14%. In 2015 the
total sales of branded drugs is 112.7 billion in RMB (about 16.1 billion in USD, representing
about 15% of the total pharmaceutical sales) and compound annual growth rate of sales of
branded drugs is projected around 25%. While the government relys upon widespread
prescription of generics in the public insurance plan to control the overall healthcare
expenditures, the growth of economy and household income, Chinese customers will likely to
switch from the domestic generic drugs to imported branded drugs.
China has used price cap regulation set by the NDRC (National Development and
Reform Commission) for many years (Mossialos 2016). Research about this price cap regulation
in China are rare, and the results are mixed. Han (2013) studied the impact of price cap
regulation of the Chinese government on pharmaceutical expenses. They used the data for
systemic antibiotics of 12 hospitals in Beijing from 1996 to 2005 and analyzed the effect on price
change and the volume change. The results showed that the price cap regulation lowered the
prices, but the expenditure on antibiotics was raised because more expensive drugs in the same
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therapeutic category were prescribed. Wu (2015) used a macro-level data between 1997 and
2008 to evaluate the effects of China's pharmaceutical price cap regulations. The results showed
that the regulations have short-run effects on pharmaceutical price indexes, reducing them by 0.5
percentage points. The price regulations fail to reduce household health expenditures and the
average profitability of the pharmaceutical industry was not impacted.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The data came from Sinopharm Group, the largest distributor of Chinese pharmaceutical
market. In 2015, the company`s revenue reached 227 billion in Chinese RMB (about 35 billion
in USD). The company provided us with the sales data to 535 hospitals in Jinlin Province from
March 2011 to August 2016, a total of 66 monthly sales data. Since June 1st, 2015, Chinese
government decided to remove price cap regulation in pharmaceutical market. There are 14
months data after the deregulation policy, 52 months data before the deregulation policy. Our
price data were extracted from db.yaozh.com, a database that contains price data of the Chinese
pharmaceutical market. Our data consists of nine categories of drugs, each categories of drugs
include both branded and generic drugs in it.
Method
We used interrupted time-series analysis (ITSA) method for each drugs (both generic and
branded) of each category to assess the change in sales associated with the deregulation of the
price cap. ITSA is a quasi-experimental design useful to evaluate the longitudinal effects of
interventions occurring at a fixed point in time on a population level, such as the
regulation/deregulation of a policy. The date of removal of the price cap in the pharmaceutical
market (June 1st, 2015) was regarded as the intervention time point for ITS analyses.
The estimation framework is as follows:
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𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑋𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑋𝑡 𝑇𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡
𝑌𝑡 is the outcome variable that measures the sales in month t, 𝑋𝑡 the time is the dummy
variable representing the intervention (equals 1 if the time is after the intervention, equals 0 if the
time is before the intervention), and 𝑋𝑡 𝑇𝑡 is the interaction term, 𝜖𝑡 is the error term.
𝛽0 represents the intercept or starting level of the outcome variable, 𝛽1 is the slope or
trend of the outcome variable until the introduction of the intervention. 𝛽2 represents the change
in the level of the outcome that occurs in the period immediately following the introduction of
the intervention. 𝛽3 represents the difference between pre-intervention and post-intervention
slopes of the outcome. Thus, a significant P value in 𝛽2 is an indicator of immediate treatment
effect and a significant P value in 𝛽3 is an indicator of a treatment effect over time.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We analyzed a total of nine categories of drugs, I listed the detailed results of
antidiabetics and oncology drugs, the results for this estimation analysis are presented in Table
3.1 and 3.2.
[Table 3.1 about here]
[Table 3.2 about here]
As we can see, the trend change are different, depends on what kind of drugs it is,
whether it is branded or generic. We further calculated each categories` Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) to see whether this is related to the level of competition. The HHI is calculated as
follows:
HHI = 𝑠12 +𝑠22 + 𝑠32 + ⋯ + 𝑠𝑛2
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where 𝑠𝑛 is the market share percentage of firm n expressed as a whole number.
According to the U.S. Department of Justice (2018), a market with an HHI of less than 1,500 is
considered a competitive marketplace, an HHI of 1,500 to 2,500 is considered a moderately
concentrated marketplace, and an HHI of 2,500 or greater is considered a highly concentrated
marketplace. The higher the HHI is, the lower the level of competition. The results of the trend
change and the respective HHI are listed in Table 3.3.
[Table 3.3 about here]
The results of our estimation framework show that, when HHI is relatively low
(competition is high), after deregulation of the price cap, the revenue of drugs does not show a
significant change (as in the case of antibiotics and gastrointestinal medications); as HHI
increases (competition becomes lower), we observe that, after deregulation of the price cap, the
revenue of generic drugs show a significant decrease (as in the case of oncology, cardio
medications, immunosuppressant, immunostimulant and eye condition medications) and the
revenue of branded drugs show a significant increase; when HHI grows really high (competition
is low), we observe an increase in the revenue of the generic drugs, however, the revenue of
branded drugs will decrease (as in the case of antidiabetics and antithrombotics). Upon price
change, when HHI is relatively low (competition is high), price change is not significant; when
HHI is high (competition is low), branded drugs will increase the price and generic drugs will
lower the price.
Discussions and Implications
Previous studies on price regulation of pharmaceutical industry usually focus on how
different price regulation regime will affect drug prices and how the effect of price regulation
differ between generic and branded drugs (Brekke 2009, Kaiser 2014), with only a few others
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studied the effect of price regulation on market share (Podnar 2007), corporate R&D investment
(Eger 2014) and physician`s prescribing behavior (Han 2015). With only one paper talking about
pharmaceutical revenue (Neeraj 2008), but the paper`s focus is on national level of
pharmaceutical revenue, not on level of drugs. In this paper, we obtained data from Sinopharm
Group on revenues of different categories of drugs from 2011 to 2016 and thus applied a natural
policy experiment study on the deregulation of price cap starting from June 2015. A direct
relation between level of competition (represented by HHI) and revenue of drugs was found.
The deregulation of price cap in China`s pharmaceutical market is a unique policy
practice since most countries are regulating price instead of de-regulating and thus it provides us
with some unique implications. First, competition does help with shaping the market
characteristics. In our results, when HHI is low (meaning competition is high), for the two
categories of drugs (antibiotics, gastrointestinal medications), after price cap deregulation, we
don`t observe a significant change both in drug price and revenue, suggesting that the
competition itself plays the role of regulation; Second, after price cap was removed, for the other
seven categories where competition is not as high as antibiotics and gastrointestinal medications,
branded drugs will increase the price and generic drugs will decrease the price, suggesting that
branded drugs have more confidence in their pricing power comparing with generic drugs,
generic drugs will lower their price with the hope of increasing the quantity; Third, although
branded drugs have more confidence in their pricing power and thus increase their price, they
don`t always end up with an increase in revenue, for the two categories (antithrombotics and
antidiabetics) where HHI is high (meaning competition is low), they raise the price more than
10% and at last suffer from a decrease in revenue; while on the contrary, the generic drugs gain
an increase in revenue.
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FIGURES AND TABLES FOR CHAPTER FOUR

Table 4.1: Estimates of Changes in Revenue for Antidiabetics Following the Deregulation of
Price Cap
𝛽

SD

P Value

Branded/Generic

Recombinant Insulin
Glargine Injection
Baseline level
Baseline trend

37324.65

17013.99

0.032

G

Price
change
-6.27%

10057.47

999.54

0.000

Level change

-2249.81

74073.24

0.976

Trend change

15070.25

7340.79

0.044**

820.67

4030.36

0.839

G

-3.11%

1973.77

200.95

0.000

Level change

-25413.66

9250.59

0.008***

Trend change

2471.07

867.08

0.006***

Humulin NPH 70/30
Baseline level
Baseline trend

84992.35

20921.10

0.000

B

+8.56%

14056.01

717.87

0.000

Level change

-117664.6

48859.96

0.019**

Trend change

-21659.64

4362.71

0.000***

Mixture Recombinant -12532.07
Human Insulin
Injection R
Baseline level
Baseline trend 2094.81

4732.04

0.010

G

-9.17%

241.47

0.000

B

+5.28%

Mixture Recombinant
Human Insulin
Injection 50 R
Baseline level
Baseline trend

Level change
Trend change
Humalog Mix50
Baseline level
Baseline trend

14821.86
3139.08
-7046.32

18552.61
1550.58
5466.26

0.427
0.047*
0.202

4708.50

291.39

0.000

Level change

-13635.79

21448.34

0.527

Trend change

-5230.03

1622.26

0.002***
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Repaglinide Tablets
Baseline level
Baseline trend
Level change
Trend change

19437.78

7386.97

0.011

3161.81
-20927.98

338.82
16744.86

0.000
0.216

B

+8.62%

-4679.34
1305.31
0.001***
(***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1)

Table 4.2: Estimates of Changes in Revenue for Oncology Drugs Following the Deregulation
of Price Cap
𝛽

SD

P Value

Branded/Generic
B

Price
change
+7.06%

B

+3.32%

G

-2.49%

G

-1.15%

G

-6.16%

Pharmorubicin
Baseline level
Baseline trend

291309

38359.33

0.000

1870.87

1608.40

0.249

Level change

-124538.7

61750.98

0.048**

Trend change

13932.4

5624.9

0.016**

Oxaliplatin
Baseline level
Baseline trend

305583.2

66531.84

0.000

8730.21

2504.19

0.001

Level change

-61612.82

117144.5

0.601

Trend change

31832.04

14316.37

0.030**

Irinotecan
Hydrochloride for
Injection
Baseline level
Baseline trend

113697.5

14346.94

0.000

3332.28

630.80

0.000

Level change

-10341.76

26747.65

0.700

Trend change

-7086.19

2871.34

0.016**

Hydroxycamptothecin
Baseline level
Baseline trend

112180.6

17302.41

0.000

-60.53

764.66

0.937

Level change
Trend change

42652.07
-4630.35

27414.63
1650.08

0.125
0.007***

Capecitabine
Baseline level

60078.88

22192.46

0.009
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Baseline trend

8178.39

1383.25

0.000

Level change
Trend change

39184.26
-26051.72

101936.1
8149.62

0.702
0.002***

Icotinib Hydrochloride
Tablets
Baseline level
Baseline trend
Level change
Trend change

182593.7

35938.62

0.000

B

+3.99%

3984.15
1450.76
0.008
-275451.4 51875.56 0.000***
11542.01
4845.82
0.021**
(***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1)

Table 4.3: Estimates of Changes in Revenue and Price for the Nine Categories of Drugs
𝑹𝑮

𝑹𝑩

𝑷𝑮

𝑷𝑩

HHI

Antibiotics

no change

no change

no change

no change

385.47

Gastrointestinal
Medications
Oncology

no change

no change

no change

no change

675.54

-

+

-11.33%

+5.89%

730.58

Cardiac Medications

-

+

-10.53%

+6.54%

1007.49

Immunosuppressant

-

+

-13.44%

+6.18%

1206.16

Eye Condition
Medications
Immunostimulant

-

+

-11.9%

+7.88%

1273.17

-

+

-12.88%

+7.01%

1304.87

Antithrombotics

+

-

-6.15%

+11.36%

1955.62

Antidiabetics

+

-

-6.34%

+14.24%

2338.10
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Figure 4.1: Recombinant Insulin Glargine Injection (G)
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Figure 4.2: Mixture Recombinant Human Insulin Injection (G)
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Figure 4.3: Mixture Recombinant Human Insulin Injection R (G)
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Figure 4.4: Humulin NPH (B)
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Figure 4.5: Humalog Mix 50 (B)
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Figure 4.6: Repaglinide Tablets (B)
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